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On September 11, 1973, Salvador Allende, the world's first democratically elected 
Marxist president, died in a bloody coup in Santiago, Chile. Since then, political scholars 
have scrutinized this phenomenon, searching for whom to hold responsible. 
During the Cold War, the US government's preoccupation with its global position 
provoked the suppression of revolutionary movements around the world. Chile, a small 
and unusually shaped country in the 'back yard' of the United States, was greatly inspired 
by the Cuban Revolution that blatantly challenged the regional hegemon. The 1970 
presidential election marked a turning point in Chilean history when it appeared that 
democratic and anti-imperialist forces had converged to set in place a revolutionary 
program and reclaim control of their country. Salvador Allende came to power calling 
for the next Marxist revolution in Chile and making his first order of business to gain 
economic sovereignty through the complete nationalization of the country's primary 
industry: copper. 
At the time of US intervention, hundreds of millions of dollars had been invested into the 
Chilean copper industry by two very powerful US multinational corporations: Anaconda 
and Kennecott. Shortly after nationalization, Allende refused to compensate the 
corporations for their massive investments, claiming his decision was in the national 
interests of the state and its sovereign power to do so. In defense of their interests, the 
MNCs turned to their home government, the United States, whose plans were already in 
motion to undermine Allende. Hence, the role of the US copper multinationals in 
Allende's overthrow remains unclear and highly susceptible to mUltiple interpretations. 
The interaction between the multinational corporation and the developing state has been 
at the center of the debates regarding the international political economy. As the 
developing world often relies on the large economic resource base of the multinational as 
a means for development, the interests of the state and the MNC are likely to conflict. 










theory accuses the MNC of being exploitative and the cause of under-development for 
the third world. Under this view, the state is defenseless against the power of the MNC. 
This study seeks to examine the validity of dependency theory for the Chilean case. It 
juxtaposes a second theory that purports an opposing hypothesis. This paradigm, known 
as the obsolescing bargaining theory, views the state as a capable actor that can defend 
itself against the MNC. 
This paper will assert that contrary to popular beliefs, the US copper multinationals were 
insignificant players in the overthrow of Allende. It engages in the case study by 
analyzing the bargaining process that took place between the multinationals and the 
Chilean state during 1950 and 1973. By showing that the copper MNCs were unable to 
defend their interests against the state, this study concludes that the dependency theory 
does not apply to the Chilean case and therefore the obsolescing bargaining theory is the 
more useful framework. 
The objectives of this study are two-fold. Firstly, it seeks to clarify the copper MNCs' 
involvement in the overthrow of Allende. And secondly, it aims to contribute to the 
ongoing debates surrounding the multinational corporation and the developing state. In 
so doing, it will disprove the validity of the dependency theory for the Chilean copper 










Table of Contents 
Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................... 1 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Approaches ............................................................ 6 
2.1. The Multinational Corporation ... ......................................................... 6 
2.2. The MNC and the State ...... ................................................................. 8 
2.3. The Us. Multinational Corporation ......... ............................................. 11 
2.4 The Rise of Dependencia in Chile and Latin America ... ............................ 13 
2.5. Dependency Theory ... ....................................................................... 16 
2.6. The Obsolescing Bargain ... ................................................................ 17 
2. 7. The Theoretical Goal ... ....................................................................... 18 
Chapter 3: The Case Study ...................................................................... 21 
3.1 Brief History of Copper in Chile ... ........................................................ 22 
3.2 The Politics of Copper, 1950-1964 ....................................................... 27 
3.3. The 1960's: Towards Nationalization .................................................. 33 
3.4. Frei and Copper, 1964-1970 ................................................ ............. .34 
3.5. The US and Frei, 1964-1970 ................................................... .......... .42 
3.6. The 1970 Elections ............... ............................................................. 46 
3.7 Allende and Copper, 1970-1973 ......................................................... .47 
3.8. US Action, 1970-1973 ........................... ........................................... .49 
3.9. The MNCs in Defense of Their Interests ......... ..................................... 53 
3.10. Chilean Politics, 1970-1973 ............................................................ 55 
Chapter 4: The Bargaining Process ........................................................... 60 
4.1 Copper Bargaining ... ........................................................................ 61 
4.2 The Determining Factor ............... ..................................................... 66 
4.3 US Interests and the Cold War .............................. .............................. 71 
4.4. Breaking Freefrom Dependencia ......... ............................................... 74 
Chapter 5: Conclusion ........................................................................... 82 
Bibliogra phy ........................................................................................ 86 










Chapter 1: Introduction 
Among the many dimensions of the international political economy, arguably the most 
important, is the proliferation of the multinational corporation (MNC). Transcending 
national boundaries, MNCs have restructured the political economy by intertwining assets, 
capital and production with such force that they alter the inherent structure of the political 
economy. 1 In the early 1990' s, the 200 largest MNCs had accumulated sales equal to one 
third of the entire world's gross domestic product. 2 The earnings of large MNCs far 
outweigh the Gross Domestic Products of many developing countries. Given their 
economic strength and resource power, multinational corporations can threaten the 
sovereign power of a nation-state? If Karl Marx is correct in claiming that "economics 
determines politics and political structure,,,4 then the role of the MNC as a major economic 
stimulus will inevitably conflate with the political processes of the host country. This poses 
a particularly delicate predicament for the developing world. 
Often developing countries are in the process of nation-building, and the outside influence 
of such strong economic powers hinders a country's struggle for sovereignty. 5 The 
traditional role of the state as the sole authority over the domestic economy is threatened by 
the penetration of the MNC. Hence, the economic advantages that MNCs offer must be 
weighed against the political costs that potentially detract from the power of the state. 
The dilemma is that many developing states have become dependent on MNCs to meet the 
rising economic needs of their populace. 6 A government that chooses to discourage 
multinationals from investing in its country potentially risks the welfare of its people. 
Likewise, a government that pushes too hard for the MNC to comply with its demands also 
risks that the MNC will relocate to another developing country. When the capacity for 
I Raymond Vernon. Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread 0/ US Enterprises (USA: Penguin Books, 
1971),15. 
2 Richard Crum and Stephen Davies. Multinationals (Oxford: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1991), 1. 
3 Vernon, 15. 
4 Karl ?vJar:-: cited in Robert Gilpin. US P(})vcr and {he .fl41!/rinoliol101 . The Political 
foreign Direct investment (New York: Basic Books, Inc., J975), 12. 
5 Werner 1. Feld. Multinational Corporations and UN Politics: The Quest/or Codes o/Conduct (:Kew York: 
Pergamon Press Inc., 1980), 3. 











development without foreign assistance is difficult or unlikely, sovereignty may take a 
backseat in a country's national priorities. 
For this reason, the debate over the multinational corporation in the international political 
economy and its power over the traditional domain of the state has become an increasingly 
popular and controversial topic in international relations. The following study also engages 
in this debate, by broadly exploring the role of the state and the role of the multinational 
corporation and how the two operate in the international political economy. In order to 
narrow the analysis, the study uses the case study of US based MNCs and the Chilean state. 
More specifically, this paper will examine the influence of US multinationals in the copper 
industry on the political domain of the Chilean state and how both players create defense 
mechanisms to protect their respective economic and political interests. 
Chile is an interesting case study for several reasons. Recognized as one of the most 
politically and economically stable countries in South America, for decades Chile's strong 
democratic culture was the paragon among its Latin American neighbors. Chile is also 
characterized by a large working class, with 70% of its population living in industrial 
centers.7 One author points out that if Marxist revolutions are to begin with the working 
class, then Chile would logically be the place for the Latin American revolution to begin.s 
Another unique attribute of Chile, and an especially important component for this study, is 
its economic history. Since its emergence as a nation-state and up until 1971, Chile's 
economy had been dependent on and defined by external forces particularly the US and 
Europe.9 This is largely due to its substantial reliance on one single commodity: copper. 
For decades, while not having state control over its copper industry, Chile was extremely 
vulnerable to foreign influence. 
Yet in the realm of international relations, Chile's dramatic political history is especially 
fascinating. Chile's political past is unlikely to be a new topic of study for any political 
scholar, for the overthrow of the world's first democratically elected Marxist leader, 
7 Jan Roxborough, Philip O'Brien, and Jackie Roddick. Chile: file State and Revolution (New York: Holmes 
& Meier Publishers, 1977), 1. 
8 Ibid. 











Salvador Allende, captivated audiences worldwide. What makes Chile's political history 
particularly interesting is the alleged involvement of the United States government and US 
multinational corporations. 
Moments before his death on September 11, 1973, Allende gave his final speech over 
government radio. In this address, Allende makes reference to US involvement: 
"This is the last chance I shall have to speak to you, to explain to you what has 
happened. Foreign capital and imperialism have allied with the forces of reaction to 
produce a climate in which the armedforces have broken ,vith tradition." 12 
Was Allende correct in accusing the US government for his downfall? By including 
'foreign capital' is Allende referring to US corporate interests? Is there any truth to these 
claims? 
Despite rumors and more radical interpretations of the actual events that took place in Chile, 
the majority of evidence now demonstrates that the US did not playa direct role in the 1973 
coup, although it made significant efforts to undermine Allende's political power through a 
number of indirect tactics. 10 Understanding the specific role the US government played in 
the overthrow of Allende is not a central objective of this study although it will be included 
in brief to provide a backdrop for the political climate that developed in Chile leading up to 
the 1973 military coup. The focus of the paper is, however, on the US-based multinational 
corporations in one particular industry: copper. 
At the time of US intervention in 1970, $748 million had been invested into the Chilean 
economy by US multinationals, the vast majority to the copper industry.)) Historically, in 
countries where the US government has decided to intervene, this amount is second only to 
Cuba in 1959. 12 During that time, Chilean copper was the largest US investment in the 
hemisphere, second only to oil in Venezuela. 13 
10 Paul E. Sigmund. The United States and Democracy in Chile (Maryland: The John Hopkins University 
Press, ] 99:;).4. 
1: U.S. Department of Commerce. SlIrwy afCurren! Business 51, No. 10 (October 1971), 
12 Ibid. 
13 Stephen Krasner. Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and Us. Foreign Policy 











For the US-based copper multinationals, Allende's Marxist ideology threatened their 
investments, and indeed, when Allende came to power in 1970, his first political agenda 
was advanced: the complete nationalization of the copper industry. The history of copper 
in Chile and the process of nationalization highlight the power dynamics between foreign 
corporations and the host state and how both actors attempted to defend their respective 
interests against the other. Hence, the central question is: How did US-based copper 
multinational corporations and the Chilean state try to protect their individual interests in 
the bargaining process over the copper industry during 1950-1973? 
This study will first describe the power dynamics between the Chilean state and the MNCs 
and proceed to highlight the bargaining process that eventually gave way for the Chilean 
state to dominate the MNCs. The central discussion will revolve around the defense 
mechanisms employed by the MNCs and the state in order to enhance their relative 
bargaining positions. The selected timeframe, 1950 and 1973, corresponds with the most 
significant transformation of the Chilean copper industry, while the greatest developments 
towards nationalization occurred under Presidents Eduardo Frei and Salvador Allende 
between 1964 and 1973. When their interests were threatened, the MNCs devised certain 
strategies to exert power over the Chilean state. The two theoretical frameworks used in 
this study purport two opposing hypotheses related to the defense strategies taken by the 
IV:lNC and the Chilean state. The analysis will assess which theory is most appropriate 
based on the empirical evidence presented in the case study. 
This thesis is essentially a study of power between the MNC and the Chilean state, and 
their interaction will be the crux of the analysis. This is a descriptive study. The specific 
objectives are to (i) understand the power dynamics that prevailed between the Chilean 
state and the copper MNCs (ii) use the Chilean case to analyze how MNCs and the state, 
specifically in raw material industries, attempt to defend their respective interests (iii) 
assess two popular theories that are commonly applied to the Chilean copper case. 
The Chilean case is particularly interesting because of three primary actors involved: the 
corporation, speci fica]]y two copper mu1till:ltionals; Chilean 
host government; and the US government. Although not central to this paper, recognizing 











comprehend the political situation which unfolded in Chile during the 1960's and 70's. To 
isolate the influence of one would depict an incomplete picture of what actually took place. 
It is, however, important to understand the two actors as individual entities with different 
motives. For the sake of making a distinction, it would be safe to understand NINCs as 
economic units that primarily seek to maximize profit, and the US government, foremost as 
a political actor, concerned with its power and position in the international political 
economy. 
This study is presented in four parts. The first part is concerned with the concept of the 
multinational corporation and its interaction with the developing state. It will present the 
backdrop for the second and most critical section: the case study. The Chilean case study 
between 1950 and 1973 is organized by presidential terms. The primary areas of focus are 
the copper programs of Eduardo Frei from 1964-1969 and Salvador Allende from 1970-
1973. The third section traces the bargaining dynamics between the Chilean state and the 
US copper MNCs and analyzes the relevant factors that enabled the state to overpower the 
MNCs. The final section refers back to conceptual models to demonstrate an overall 
understanding and appreciation for the greater theoretical implications of the case study. 
Although the focus of the analysis is largely theory based, bear in mind that the Chilean 
copper case study is of relevance and interest in and of itself. While the broader theoretical 
implications are worthy of academic attention, this study uses a theoretical context to 
further advance an overall understanding of the case itself and not specifically to relate, 
prove, or develop broader conceptual issues. The larger ambitions of this study are to 
contribute to the debate on the multinational corporation and the developing state, and to 
further elucidate a critical decade of Chile's political history - a case that has captivated the 











Chapter 2: Theoretical Approaches 
The following chapter is an amalgamation of various elements that present the backdrop for 
analyzing Chile's copper nationalization process. While there is an enormous literature 
about the multinational corporation and the state, this will not be explored in this study. 
For the purposes of this paper, the MNC and the state should be understood as unitary 
actors with self-interest based objectives. This chapter will only briefly touch on the 
behaviors of the actors, but will more thoroughly explore the interaction of the developing 
state and the MNC. This interaction will be assessed using two particular theoretical 
paradigms: dependency and the obsolescing bargain. A particular focus on dependency 
theory is provided as it was a particularly powerful ideological force in Chile and inspired 
the movement towards nationalization in Chile. Other relevant dimensions to the case 
study are the Cold War environment, which shaped Chile's policies against the 
multinationals and US policies towards Chile, and the nature of the copper industry. All of 
these factors shaped the political outcomes in Chile between 1950 and 1973 and are 
therefore necessary to expound upon in detail. 
2.1. The Multinational Corporation 
Often referred to as a multinational or transnational corporation in academic works, for the 
purposes of this paper, a multinational corporation will be defined as a firm with production 
capacities located in multiple countries. Ownership, management, production, and 
marketing can simultaneously occur across a number of national borders.14 Typically, there 
is a parent firm which coordinates its subsidiaries in other parts of the world under one 
production strategy. MNCs seek a comparative advantage and market power. Ml~Cs, like 
all corporations, can be characterized as profit-maximizing entities, who try to manipulate 
market conditions to work in their favor. 
Advocates of the multinational corporation and a free market economy argue that the 
multinational has the· capacity to spur economic development, particularly in countries 
where the need is imperative. IS As one author correctly notes, the multinational has the 
14 Gilpin, US Power and the Multinational Corporation, 10. 











capacity to not only 'think big', but indeed, to 'act big'. 16 Indeed, the capacity to 'act' is a 
common shortcoming of the developing state. For this reason, traditional theory lends to 
the notion that foreign direct investment is positive for development. 17 Many theorists 
contend that the nation-state concedes power to the MNC because the MNC is better 
equipped to meet the economic needs of the state's population. I8 Robert Gilpin writes that 
"[the nation-state] cannot retain its traditional independence and sovereignty and 
simultaneously meet the expanding economic needs and desires of its populace". 19 
Therefore, the MNC enables nation-states to provide for the welfare of its population. 
Particularly for economically unstable countries, the hefty resource base of the MNC may 
be its only means of provision. Because of its ability to accrue wealth and spur economic 
development, the multinational becomes an instrument of power.20 Yet because MNCs are 
flexible and mobile by nature, they have the option to move their production wherever they 
choose - a constant fear to a state in need of financial support.21 Therefore, the financial 
muscle and international clout of the MNC, makes it a powerful political tool that can 
potentially alter or even overturn the politics of a country.22 
As a profit-maximizing entity, the multinational corporation will seek out ways to enhance 
its position and defend its interests if threatened, including political intervention ifpossible. 
Yet, the political consequences of this behavior for the third world are far more threatening 
than those for the first world.23 The MNC's ability to intervene in domestic politics and 
influence the decision making process of the host government proves problematic as 
corporate policies are much more likely to reflect the corporation's own interests and the 
interests of their home state over those of the host state. In general, foreign MNCs prefer a 
low visibility in host governments and will hesitate to participate in political activities in 
16 Sidney Dell. A Latin American Common jl-farket? (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 175. 
17 C. Fred Bergsten, Thomas Horst, and Theodore H. Moran. American Multinationals and American Interests 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978),354. 
18 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 288. 
19 Ibid., 290. 
20 Ibid, 4. 
21 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 289. 
22 Ibid, 273. 
23 Joan E. Spero and Jeffrey A. Hart. The Politics of International Economic Relations. Sixth Edition, 











the host environment because it increases their visibility.24 Often, the sheer size of these 
institutions increases the probability of public attention and political activity.25 Moreover, 
as foreign owned entities, MNCs are not considered legitimate forces in national politics?6 
It is imperative to understand that although MNCs share several universal traits and behave 
akin, the type of industry largely determines the bargaining leverage that a MNC holds 
against the state. Particularly natural resource industries are characterized by specific traits 
that affect its bargaining power. In this example, copper is an immobile investment; the 
opportunity for capital flight is limited if not nonexistent. Aside from requiring enormous 
initial investments, rich copper deposits are also relatively difficult to find in the world. 
The traits of the copper industry will be a recurring theme in the analysis of the bargaining 
process that took place between the MNC and the Chilean state. 
2.2. The MNC and the State 
This study follows Robert Dahl's definition of Power: Actor A has power over actor B to 
the extent that A can get B to do something B would not otherwise do.27 For the Chilean 
copper case, the bargaining process between the MNC and the state is the channel through 
which the two actors attempt to exert their relative power over the other. Both actors will 
seek to alter the behavior of the other in order to increase their bargaining power. 
Throughout the bargaining process, an actor will continuously seek to tip the balance of 
power to alter the behavior of the other actor to gain an advantage over the other actor.28 
For the purposes of this paper and the analysis of power, it can be assumed that the state, as 
a unitary and rational actor, will seek to maximize its power. 29 Power for the state is 
enforced by its ability to control its own destiny, or its sovereignty.30 Hedley Bull writes 
24 Wendy 1. Hansen and Neil J. Mitchell, "Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political Activity: 
Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics", American Political Science Review (Vol. 94, No.4, 
December 2000), 893. 
25 Ibid., 899. 
26 Spero and Hart, 273. 
27 Robert A. Dahl. "The Concept of Power", Behavioral Science, Vol. 2 (1957): 202. 
28 Douglas C. Bennett and Kenneth E. Sharpe. Transnational CaljJ()ra/ions Verslls the State: The Political 
t-·conomy of the lvlexican Autu induslly (Princdon: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1985), 84. 
29 Stephen D. Krasner. Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University 












that sovereignty is the constitutive principal of the international system. 31 The current 
international system is compromised of sovereign nation-states that sit at the hierarchy of 
authority as the only legitimate political organization in the system. 32 Sovereignty grants 
the state the power to exercise full control over the populations residing in their national 
territories and delineates that no other state, government, or political entity can intervene or 
compete with this jurisdiction. 33 Robert Gilpin evaluates the role of the nation-state and 
says the accumulation of power and wealth aim to satisfy the interests of states.34 Under 
this theoretical framework, a country's national capacity to provide for the welfare of its 
populace does not interfere in the sovereign control of the nation. All states formally 
recognize that states have the right to choose the economic behavior that takes place within 
their territories.35 However, the introduction of the multinational corporation in the global 
system has challenged the sovereign control of the nation-state, a peril that poses a far 
greater threat to developing countries than their wealthier counterparts. 
One interpretation in international politics is that the behavior of states is determined by 
their relative power capabilities. States are more complex by nature, by demands, by 
responsibilities and goals than MNCS. 36 It is difficult to identify one single behavior of the 
state that classifies it as a rational actor, such as profit maximizing for the MNC. 37 It is also 
difficult to identify the multitude of dimensions and responsibilities of the state. For this 
paper, there are two particular dimensions of the state that need to be identified: the 
political leadership, and the domestic populace - or the social foundation - that it serves. 
Political leadership is foremost concerned with its own political agenda, most typically to 
remain in power. For democratic societies particularly, the interests of political leadership 
are primarily shaped by its social foundation. 38 As the demands of the social foundation 
31 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1977), 17. 
32 Krasner, Sm/ctural Conflict, 73-74. 
33 Steven Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia", International Security, Vol. 20. No.3 (Winter, 1995-1996): 
115 [Electronic). Available from JSTOR at: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-
2889%28199524%2F 199624%2920%3A3%3C 115%3ACW%3E2.0.co%3 B2-YM IT [2005, Dec 9]. 
34 For the purposes of this paper, "power" should be understood as the ability to achieve a specific goal; 
"wealth" should be understood that produces future income 
Krasner, StruClural Conjlict, 177. 
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change, the interests of the leadership must follow.39 This aligns with the primary objective 
of the leadership to build and maintain power, which is most legitimately accomplished 
through the satisfaction and support of its social foundation. The social foundation is 
primarily concerned with its welfare. In democratic societies, such as Chile, one of the 
principal manners through which the state remains in office is by increasing the welfare of 
its social foundation. Hence, it becomes a primary responsibility of the political leadership 
to improve, or at least attempt to improve, the welfare of its populace. Therefore, the 
notion that the government can act "just as it pleases" and enforce whichever policies it 
desires is contingent on the state's ability to support the welfare of its populace 
autonomously. The state seeks to effectively and efficiently regulate its economy and 
direct the economic welfare of the country in order to build the capacity to support the 
welfare of its populace.4o 
The frustration of foreign corporate activity for the host state lies in the fact that the major 
corporate decisions are made by executives outside of the host country, isolating the host 
state from the decision making process in the corporation's decisions. As these MNCs 
exercise some control over the production capacity of the country, they also influence the 
economic performance of the country and hence its development path. MNCs can either 
enhance or hurt the functional capacity of the state in achieving its economic goals, but they 
will inevitably have some influence over the state's sovereign control over the economy.41 
Therefore, the most profound consequence of foreign investment is the lack of decision 
making power, or essentially the loss of full control over the economic control of the 
state.42 When such massive economic instruments enter the domain of the state, the state 
can attempt to moderate rvfNC actions by imposing formal regulations through public 
policies that alter its behavior to comply with the needs of the country. Essentially, it is the 
state's sovereign right to act as it pleases, but its sovereignty, particularly in a democratic 
society, is constrained by its economic competency. 
39 Ihicl. 
~,i Ibid., 10. 
41 Krasner, Stn/clura! Conflict, 180. 
42 Paul E. Sigmund. Multinationals in Latin America: The Politics ojNationalization (Wisconsin: The 











Nevertheless, sovereignty is the state's first and foremost most important leverage tool. 
The ability to grant the corporation access to its territory is derived from the state's power 
and leverage to do SO.43 The state's greatest strength is its sovereign control over all 
activities within its borders. This, in tum, is the inherent disadvantage of the multinational; 
the state ultimately maintains sovereign decision making control, or the 'final say', over its 
territory. 
Yet to restrict the actions of the MNC depends on the state's own capacity to assume those 
responsibilities, such as to produce capital, technical expertise, and market access. 44 
Democratic governments incapable of providing its populace with these services become 
reliant on external forces or other private agents to do so and consequently must relinquish 
some of the state's autonomy.45 The more reliant the state is, the more autonomy it will 
have to acquiesce. For dependency theorists, this is a principal fear for the developing 
world and the multinational corporation. 
2.3. The U.S. Multinational Corporation 
For Robert Gilpin, who sees the multinational corporation as the principal actor in the 
global political economic system, the MNC represents an interplay of dynamics that are 
dictated by the political relations between countries who use the MNC to pursue their own 
foreign policy objectives.46 Many scholars find this perspective controversial as the MNC 
is often perceived as an independent entity of the liberal global system, free from the 
control of nation-states. Aligned with this mind frame, the MNC, by its very nature, will 
assert its independence from all government control, focusing its efforts on the expansion 
and accumulation of profits. 
As the prime advocate and essentially the symbol for an open international economy, the 
MNC generally prefers minimal government involvement, including from its home country, 
until its interests are threatened. When its power is limited by the host state's policies, the 
:MNC will naturally try to protect itself.47 This includes conferring with other agents of 
43 Krasner, Slnrrtllral 177. 
41 Krasner, Sll'llclllral ConjliCl, 177. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 7. 











power that can induce the host state's compliance, such as the home government, 
international organizations, and other global players. The debate over the independence of 
the multinational from its home country is of particular interest for the developing world. 
The notion of independence for the US multinational corporation is an essential component 
to the Chilean copper case. As the world's super power, the US has defined and shaped the 
rules of the global system to maintain power. In her analysis of the structure of the political 
economy, Susan Strange argues that power determines the relationship between the state 
and market. Strange seeks to understand the 'authority' of power, claiming that it is not 
enough to ask who has it, but why.48 According to Strange, power in the political economy 
is derived from three sources: force, wealth, and ideas. If Gilpin is correct in his claim that 
Ml\JCs are extensions of their home states who gain power through the MNC's 
accumulation of wealth, then the MNC buttresses the global hegemonic position of the US. 
The case study for this paper looks specifically at natural resource multinationals. In this 
sector, the US has successfully managed to control the world's access to raw materials 
through foreign investment, thus advancing its dominant position in the international 
political economy.49 This position has also ensured a consistent American supply during 
times of scarcity and negated price increases. 50 By creating policies that encourage 
corporate expansion abroad and foster friendly relations with host governments, the US has 
used the MNC to broaden its sphere of influence. Gilpin precisely reinforces this idea 
when he argues that "[t]he multinational corporation has prospered because it has been 
dependent on the power of, and consistent with the political interests of, the United 
States. ,,51 
Natural resource industries, often referred to as strategic industries, are one area of foreign 
investment directly connected to US national interests.52 Percy Bidwell, in reference to US 
dependence on raw materials, alludes to the relationship that exists between core and 
periphery countries, and states: "Our dependence on foreign countries for supplies is 
48 Susan Slates and Markels, edition (London: Pinter, 1994),23-24, 
Gilpin, US Power and the Mullinational Corporation, 148, 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., 41. 











matched only by their dependence on our markets.,,53 Because of the core's dependence on 
raw materials for its industrial advancement, direct government intervention may be 
justified to secure cheap sources of the mineraL54 The need to assure this access also 
warrants the US government's support of US corporate investment. 
Although not a principal objective of this paper, the shared and divergent interests of the 
US government and the US MNCs regarding Chilean politics and the copper industry will 
be analyzed through a similar position as Gilpin. More central to this study is the 
relationship between the MNC and the Chilean state, particularly how the Chilean state 
perceived foreign corporate influences within its territory. As this next section will explain, 
the theoretical influences of the time largely inspired Chile's drive to nationalize its copper 
industry. 
2.4 The Rise of Dependencia in Chile and Latin America 
The dependencia model is most popularly used by scholars to describe the Chilean case. 
The purpose of the theory for this study is two-fold: first, to understand the mindset of the 
Chilean state during the bargaining process that took place between 1950-1973; and second, 
to use the model to theoretically contextualize the role the US copper MNCs played in 
Chile. 
Between 1950 and 1973, a revolutionary movement of independencia swept through Chile. 
lndependencia, or a break away from dependencia, impelled Chile to reclaim its foreign 
dominated copper industry. The preeminent scholar Theodore Moran conducts a historical 
study of the Chilean copper industry and analyzes the role the Chilean state played in 
recapturing its copper industry from US multinational corporations and breaking free from 
dependency. 55 The context for the dependency theory sets the backdrop to understand the 
nationalist fervor that underpinned the copper nationalization process in Chile. 
The influx of dependency theory in Chile in the early 1960's corresponded with the greater 
Latin American response to the economic and political role that the US played throughout 
Percy W. Bidwell. Raw Muterials. A Study o/American Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 19S11), 9. 
54 Sigmund, Multinationals in Latin America, 307. 
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the continent. Dependency theorists of the time argued that multinational corporations 
assist in developing the first world by further under-developing the third world. The 
dependencia framework relies on the global system as the unit of analysis and focuses on 
how this system engages with nation-states. 56 Dependencia argues that production in 
developing countries is aimed at capital accumulation for developed countries, and thus 
breeds 'imperialism.,s7 Anti-imperialist sentiments surged through the continent calling 
for an end to dependency. 
Dependency is a blend of Marxism and nationalism,58 both of which have deep roots in 
Latin America. One of the first third world regions to gain its independence from 
colonialism, the desire to maintain its continental sovereignty has been shared throughout 
Latin America.59 The first economic theoretical application of the continent was the law of 
comparative advantage based on an export-oriented strategy.60 Chile and most of Latin 
America's greatest comparative advantage lies in its supply of raw materials.61 It was only 
in the 1930's that the pro-industrialization movement called for greater state involvement in 
order to regain control over their respective economies. Chile led the way in its efforts to 
create a larger state role in the economy.62 The economy oriented towards traditional 
protection-oriented policies, namely import-substitution, which was accompanied by the 
formation of new public enterprises, such as the Chilean Development Corporation63 geared 
at state-led industrial development.64 The institution symbolized a direct involvement of 
the state in economic affairs, the very antithesis of liberal economic doctrine. 
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In the 1960's Raul Prebish claimed that Latin American development was stifled by 
"structural" problems. Prebish was the first to divide the world into the core (the developed 
world) and the periphery (the developing world) and argued that the position for the 
periphery is continually declining relative to the core because of the structure of global 
production.65 A few years later, in the heat of the Cold War, a more radical theory known 
as dependency theory, emerged in Latin America, most forcefully in Cuba and Chile where 
the Marxist movement was the strongest. As the Cold War proceeded, the world found 
itself divided by opposing ideologies and doctrines. 
The Cuban Revolution captured the world's attention and made Latin America, the 
backyard of the United States, a battle ground for ideological warfare.66 Marxists attacked 
capitalism as a system of exploitation and dependency, and cited Chilean copper as a prime 
example. Anti-dependency sentiments gained popularity in Latin America as governments 
and the general public began to associate the 'condition' with national dependency and 
exploitation, and blamed the grave inequality between the core and periphery on the North 
American capitalist system. 67 One author notes that the allure of the Marxist-Leninist 
theory was simple: it provided an easy explanation for Latin American underdevelopment, 
one that the masses could understand and participate in easily.68 Under this view, interests 
of foreign investors and those of the host state were directly opposed. Dependency theory 
became intensely politically charged. This was particularly evident in Chile, a country 
whose economy since the country's independence had been directed by foreigners. 
Dependency theorists argued that Latin American economies in particular were held 
captive by the US who exploited the continent for its raw materials.69 Inspired by the 
Marxist movement, Chile used the tools laid out by Marx to break out of this system. It 
identified capitalist countries, especially the US, as the enemy, and foreign economic 
65 Skidmore and Smith, 363. 
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activity, particularly US multinationals, as the primary hindrance to Chile's economIc 
development.7o 
This sets the stage for understanding Chile's mindset leading up to complete nationalization 
in 1972. Ideology, this study will assert, was a driving force behind the Chilean state to 
nationalize the US MNCs. Of less importance, but still of relevance, this paper also 
insinuates that the Cold War ideology was the determining factor that made the US 
government deny MNC requests for support during the nationalization process. The 
various ideological developments at the time reveal the very essence of what defined and 
inspired Chile's copper nationalization. 
Aside from its strong ideological influence in Chile, dependency theory is also the most 
popular paradigm used to describe the Chilean case. This study examines the merit of two 
paradigms to describe the Chilean copper case: dependency and the obsolescing bargain. 
2.5. Dependency Theory 
The dependency perspective is concerned with how MNC interactions with a periphery 
state impede the state's development, arguing that external forces determine the pace and 
direction of state development.7l Rooted in Marxism, the paradigm is concerned with the 
integration of periphery countries in the capitalist world system which puts them at a 
disadvantageous position relative to that of core countries.72 As dependency theory is 
multi-faceted, it will not be explicitly defined in this paper, but rather utilized in a more 
abstract form for the Chilean case. 
Dependency theory is a theoretical framework that subsumes various interpretations 
centered on the structure of the international system. In relation to the multinational 
corporation and the developing world, this theory purports that the penetration of the MNC, 
which is generally based in the world's most powerful countries, into periphery economies 
will pervert economic growth and extract valuable resources that would otherw'ise reinforce 
70 Sigmund, Multinationals in Latin America, 32. 
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national development.73 As the periphery state's development is dependent on the ~~Cs 
economic resource base, the state must relinquish its sovereignty to external forces whose 
interests contradict with its development goals. Implicit in the dependency theory is that 
the state is a weaker actor than the MNC and cannot defend its interests against those of the 
MNC. 
Those of the dependentista school argue that dependence and underdevelopment limit a 
state's internal market, its technical and cultural capacity to produce, as well as the physical 
and moral well being of its populace.74 In reference to third world countries who are well-
endowed with natural resources, the MN C' s corporate strategy of vertical integration the 
control of all steps of mineral production, from extracting and refining to the sale and 
distribution of the finished goods - suffocates economic growth and breeds dependency, 
and therefore independence would require either a major transformation of the system or 
complete destruction of it.75 For this reason, Marxists advocate large scale revolutionary 
movements.76 
For scholars who align with this view, the very existence of the MNC in the developing 
world impedes the development paths of developing countries. Such ideologists claim that 
the MNCs goad international exploitation and call for economic development to come from 
the hand of the state and not from foreign investors.77 
2.6. The Obsolescing Bargain 
The obsolescing bargain purports the contrary interpretation of the relationship between the 
state and the MNC. Implicit in this theory is that foreign direct investment and MNC 
activities generate positive outcomes for the developing state by stimulating economic 
development.78 This paradigm asserts that the MNC can assist in the advancement of the 
developing world and help to empower the state to attain its development goals. The 
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obsolescing bargaining theory sees the state as a powerful actor in the world system with 
the ability to direct its own development and shape the MNC influences to assist in its 
development goals. 
The theory focuses on the shifting relationship between the host country and MNC. This 
process involves two steps: make attractive concessions to bring in foreign investment and 
then renegotiate the initial agreements to harness the MNC to the goals of the host state. 
The theory asserts that developing countries are initially very welcoming and open to 
foreign investment because of the benefits that MNCs bring to the country. This places the 
bargaining chips in the hands of the foreign ~1NC. Once having committed large 
investments and developed industries in the host country, the MNCs are able to reap the 
fruits of their investments through huge profits. As the host government observes these 
profits leaving the country, they become critical of the firms and seek a greater share of the 
profits. Then begins a series of renegotiations as the host country realizes it was too 
generous in the initial agreements.79 The government continues to try to raise the bar of 
holding the MNC more accountable to the state, consistently attempting to mold the MNC 
to serve the interests of the state, whether it be through elevating the tax rate, encouraging 
the expansion of production, or demanding more capital investment. In each negotiation, 
the state seeks to advance its bargaining position, and establishes new terms that previously 
would never have been accepted by the MNC. 80 Eventually, the only solution available to 
the "obsolescence of the bargain" is the complete government take-over, or nationalization, 
of the industry.S] 
2.7. The Theoretical Goal 
The theoretical aim of this study is to assess the two theoretical paradigms discussed above 
that are commonly used to describe the Chilean copper case. The bargaining process 
between the Chilean state and the US copper MNCs will be the focus of the analysis as the 
means for evaluating the relevance of the two theories. After the delineation of the case 
study in the next chapter, the theoretical models will be reintroduced in the final analysis of 
this paper. 
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As described above, the dependency and obsolescing theories suggest opposmg 
interpretations of the role of the MNC in the developing world as well as contradictory 
hypotheses related to the power of each actor. It is in this contradiction of hypotheses that 
this study applies the empirical case study of Chilean copper. 
The rumors surrounding the most famous period in Chile's political history insinuate that 
the foreign corporate powers played a significant role in the political and economic crises in 
Chile, specifically in the overthrow of Allende. Dependistas argue that the developing state 
cannot defend itself from powerful MNCs who exploit the developing world to make the 
developed world richer. The power of the MNCs is derived from a number of factors, such 
as support from its home country and the capitalist structure of the global political economy. 
In conjunction with this theory, there are various outcomes that could result from the 
bargaining process between the state and the MNC. These outcomes would either leave the 
Chilean state completely disempowered in the bargaining process, or as the state gained 
bargaining leverage, the theory suggests that the MNC would counter state advancements 
through various tactics, such as manipulating the global economy or pressuring its home 
country to come to its defense. After all, MNCs are expected to engage in political 
activities in order to maximize their profits or avoid financial losses. 82 
There are a few critical facts that lie at the crux of this case study: (i) the Chilean copper 
industry was nationalized in 1972 by President Salvador Allende (ii) an economic and 
political crisis occurred in Chile during Allende's three years in power (iii) Allende died in 
a military coup in 1973. 
According to the dependency theory, MNCs will engage in defending their interests when 
these interests are threatened and will sllcceed because of their position in the global 
political economy relative to the periphery country. The obsolescing bargaining theory 
suggests a different outcome: the state can succeed in overtaking its industry and prevent 
the MNC from successfully defending its interests. In order to determine the more relevant 
theoretical framework, the following question must be answered: To what extent did the 
US-based copper MNCs influence the crisis and overthrow of Allende? 











It is imperative to bear in mind that no theory exists in a vacuum and one case study cannot 
confirm or refute a theory. The theoretical analysis is incorporated in this study to 
demonstrate awareness to larger implications of relevant theories and to better understand 
the outcomes of the case. Most significant, however, is the empirical case study, which is of 











Chapter 3: The Case Study 
This chapter is dedicated to explaining the dynamics that unraveled between the Chilean 
state, the US-based copper MNCs, and the US government. It begins by outlining the 
history of the MNCs in Chile, and describing the various approaches taken by different 
presidents beginning in 1950. As will be shown, the policies towards the MNCs 
implemented by Frei and Allende, represent the periods when the process of nationalization 
were most definitively pushed forward and are therefore the most critical analytical points. 
One noteworthy dimension to this particular study of multinational corporate behavior 
relative to the host state is the specific approach towards analyzing the impact the MNCs 
had on the state. MNCs are known for trying to enhance their position through altering 
host country policies for a myriad of reasons, such as to avoid required tax payments, 
repatriate higher profits, or have less environmental regulation. To do this, they may to try 
influence policy making through various venues, such as supporting certain local political 
candidates who represent their interests, form lobbying groups, rely on their home 
governments to strengthen their bargaining position, and create networks among local 
corporate elites that will support their interests politically. In this way, the MNC assumes a 
unique political role in the host country. 
While the copper MNCs over their six decades of history in Chile may have behaved 
similarly, the focus of this paper is geared towards the economic predominance of these 
MNCs. Indeed, it was the economic prowess of these MNCs that enraged the Chilean 
populace rather than the direct political actions on the part of the MNCs. Yet, the political 
role assumed by the MNCs is critical for understanding how the US-based copper YINCs 
acted in defense of their interests. Hence, this study is not primarily concerned with the 
direct political interference of the copper MNCs on the Chilean state prior to the point 
when they needed to defend their interests, most blatantly under Frei and Allende between 
1964 and 1973. Therefore, when trying to contextualize the role the copper giants played 
in Chile, it is imperative to understand them as extremely powerful economic forces that 











3.1 Brief History of Copper in Chile 
For decades prior to the discovery of copper, Chile's prime export and economic pillar was 
nitrates. These mines were foreign owned, mostly by the British, and taxes from the 
industry accounted for 97% of state revenues; the beginning of a legacy of state 
dependency on foreign investment that would continue for nearly a century. 83 As one 
author writes, "the era of nitrates in Chile was an era of liberalism run rampant.,,84 As the 
economy was completely dependent on a single commodity, the entire fabric of Chilean 
society and politics also relied on the fate of this industry. Therefore, a single loose thread 
in this fabric would lead to a complete collapse in the country's welfare and stability.85 
Copper was actually first discovered in Chile in the 1880' s, but at that time, nitrates 
consumed the majority of foreign interest and investment. Yet, with the market of nitrates 
virtually nonexistent, new investors came into Chile for this new natural resource. There 
were two multinational corporations that dominated the Chilean copper industry: Anaconda 
and Kennecott. The large mining sector that the US-MNCs comprised were collectively 
called the "Gran Mineria". 
These firms were large oligopolies that were US owned and vertically integrated.86 They 
primarily exported crude copper to be processed, refined, and distributed outside of Chile. 
The copper industry accounted for the second largest US foreign investment for raw 
materials, after petroleum. 87 
Both Anaconda and Kennecott had an extensive history of copper mmmg m Chile. 
Kennecott opened copper production first in 1915, by gaining control of its largest copper 
mine, EI Teniente, from the Guggenheims. EI Teniente, under Kennecott management, 
would become the largest copper mine in the world.88 
The invention of synthetic nitrates during the First World War left the Chilean economy in 
a severe crisis. Around this time, the US government provided Chile with a series of new 
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loans and the Chilean government in tum handed over the copper deposits to US 
multinational corporations.89 As the Chilean government lacked the resources, knowledge 
and experience to consider managing the mines themselves they granted foreign 
multinational corporations relatively uncontested power by placing minimal taxation and 
regulations on the industry. The copper boom of the 1920's allowed these two firms to 
accrue large profits, and the Chilean government imposed very few restrictions. 
Because of their powerful economic influence, domestic politics often fell subject to the 
actions of these foreign entities. No decision or policies could be made without calculating 
the affect on and response of these MNCs, leaving the Chilean government vulnerable to 
foreign demands. This vulnerability frustrated the Chilean government who on the one 
hand sought to accommodate the MNCs and reap the benefits of the local activities, yet, on 
the other hand, wanted them to be more responsive to this country in which they 
monopolized so much power.90 
When it first opened for operation in 1915, Kennecott was reported to have paid only 0.8% 
of its total gross sales to tax.91 In 1922, after seven years of investment in the copper mines, 
sufficient time to begin making marginal profits off the investment, the state changed its tax 
scheme from gross sales to profits. At this point, a more hefty tax rate was imposed on 
total profits, at 6%.92 Yet, the state made the decision under great anxiety that Anaconda 
and Kennecott would leave.93 The initial actions of the state towards the foreign owned 
copper industry represent the beginning of the power battle between the state and the 
foreign MNCs that would define the political history of the Chilean copper industry. In 
1925, this rate increased an additional 6%. In 1934, the tax percentage rose an additional 
6%, and by 1939, the copper tax rose to 33%. In summation, over a 15 year period, the tax 
rate on copper profits increased from 6% to 33%, representing a 450% increase in the tax 
rate, or 4.5 times the original rate. 
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Another economic instrument that the Chilean state used to curb MNC power was the 
exchange rate. The Great Depression severely hurt the Chilean economy, with its value of 
exports dropping 87%. 94 Consequently the Chilean state imposed an exchange rate 
purposefully kept low for all dollars the lv1NCs brought into the country as it was desperate 
for foreign currency. Between 1932 and 1955, Chile enforced a multiple exchange rate 
system (tvfERS) based on export rates that discriminated against all expenditures associated 
with the production of copper by the Gran Mineria. 95 The intention behind using the 
tvfERS was to allow the state to discriminate against specific exports and thereby acquire 
more foreign exchange that would increase the power of the state over the balance of 
payments and minimize external influences.96 Clearly, the government felt it was capable 
of enforcing harsh policies against the MNCs and deserving of an increased share of the 
profits. 
Chile's economy would have been completely devastated by the Great Depression ifnot for 
the sudden demand of copper on the world market. Western multinational corporations. 
permeated into every copper endowed country around the globe. Copper deposits are 
located in several regions around the world, including the US, however, high-grade copper 
deposits are only found in few locations.97 These copper rich deposits are mainly found in 
Third world countries, such as Chile, Peru, Zaire, and Zambia.98 One author contends that 
these countries are so desperate for foreign exchange that they are very willing to succumb 
to the demands of foreign investors and will continue to produce at a loss when the price 
drops drastically.99 Chile was equally desperate for the economic benefits of the MNC, 
namely to develop the industry. The largest US copper NINCs selected Chile as the place 
to expand their investments. (See Appendix lA) For the development of a single mine, 
MNCs committed five years of labor and millions of dollars in capital investment. loo Such 
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enormous investments in time and capital required the MNCs to cautiously select host 
countries where economic nationalism would not threaten their investments. 101 
With the expansIOn of the electrical industry in the 1930's, world demand for copper 
soared. 102 Before World War II, copper was not considered a strategic or even critical 
material for the US, as it possessed enough copper deposits of its own to sustain the 
industrial demand in the country and simultaneously serve as one of the largest global 
producers and exporters of the product. 103 After World War II, fear that copper deposits 
would exhaust led multinationals to move faster and further into copper rich countries 
where they could feasibly and cheaply extract and export the raw mineral. 104 There was an 
enormous demand for copper from the US domestic market for both peacetime (mostly 
electrical manufacturing and construction) and war-time (mostly production of munitions, 
tanks, airplanes, and naval ships) usage. !Os By the time the Korean War began, US began 
stockpiling Chilean copper for fear of market shortages. 106 The US wanted a million tons 
of copper in the 'strategic stockpile' to protect the country from a potential war 
emergency-a supply that would allow all domestic US industries to function at full 
capacity for three full years in waL I07 The US consumed 65% of Chile's copper, virtually 
all produced and managed by Kennecott and Anaconda. 108 (See Appendix 2A & 2B) 
Hence, Chilean copper supply became integrated into US foreign policy, and the US rvtNCs 
became the essential conductors for US supply. 109 
In Chile, US corporations handled every aspect of operation, from the extraction, 
innovation, production, and transportation, to the distribution of the final product. Until the 
1960s, the Chilean copper mines were completely owned by North American firms, 
Anaconda and Kennecott being the two giants controlling nearly 80% of copper production. 
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102 Mira Wilkins, "Multinational Corporations: A Historical Account" in Transnational Corporations and the 
Global Economy, eds. R. Kozul-Wright and R. RO\\'1hom (New York: Pal grave, 1998), 109. 
103 Bidwell, 103. 
104 Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence, 1 IS. 
105 Bidwell. 107. 
106 Ibid., 125. 
107 Ibid., 128, 13. 
108 Ibid., 107. 











The parent corporations for both firms were in New York, and all of the sales and 
fabricating subsidiaries were either in the US or Western Europe. 
Chile's dependence on its copper industry should not be underestimated. The state was 
highly dependent on the revenues from this single industry to provide for the welfare of its 
populace. For Chile, these MNCs' activities generated an enormous percentage of its tax 
revenues and foreign exchange. Copper comprised 80% of Chile's total exports. ll 0 Tax 
revenues from these MNCs covered up to 40% of government expenditures. I I I And copper 
exports under these two firms produced nearly 80% of Chile's currency earnings. lJ2 
Foreign exchange IS especially important for developing countries to undergo 
industrialization. ll3 When revenues were scarce, the government relied on foreign capital 
through private and public loans to cover its foreign exchange deficit. In order to fill the 
shortage of resources at home, the state printed money as inflationary deficit financing. 
Hence, inflation became a grave problem that exacerbated whenever the price of copper fell 
on the world markets. I 14 This made foreign exchange an even more precious resource, and 
the copper MNCs, the source of this resource, extremely powerful institutions within the 
country_ The reliance on a sole raw material for export creates a "precarious balance".ll5 
Any slump produced by internal or external forces will inevitably create a crisis for the 
entire nation and trigger a sequence of descending trends. 
Because of its dependence on solely copper to support its economy, the Chilean 
government lacked alternatives to cope with large deficits other than raising the rate of 
inflation and then printing money in response to the high inflation rates. This inflationary 
cycle generated conflict among laboring classes who strained for livable wages that 
coincided with the rising rates of inflation. 1 16 The working class grew aware and resentful 
towards these foreign MNCs who were remitting huge profits at the state's expense, and as 
resentment escalated, nationalization became the answer. 
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Thus, the state began to exert its power over the MNCs more forcefully. The state was 
fully aware of the economic stronghold these corporations held over the country, as well as 
the immense profits these MNCs had accumulated over the past thirty years. In the early 
1950's, when copper demand and profits from the industry were at a high, taxes raised to 
70%.1l7 The state moved to a pegged exchange rate which, when combined with the 
increased tax rate, allowed the Chilean state to obtain 86% of gross profits from copper. ll8 
Because of such stringent profit regulations, increased taxes, and harsh rent extraction 
policies, the US MNCs hesitated to further invest in the industry. Without new investment, 
Chilean share of world copper production dropped by 9%.119 Thus, the foreign MNCs still 
played a critical role in the Chilean economy. 
Over the following two decades the struggle for power over the US copper MNCs 
dominated Chile's political agenda. It also represents a point in Chilean politics when the 
population took a more active interest in the country's political and economic matters. 
3.2 The Politics o/Copper, 1950-1964 
Salvador Allende, who would assume presidency in 1970, first began his run for presidency 
with the socialist party in 1942. Allende called for state control of marketing and price 
setting, which would be supported by creating new trade relations with the Soviet bloc. 
During the Cold War, all sales to the Soviet Union or Soviet allies were forbidden by the 
US govemment. 120 This infuriated the socialist left as an ideological challenge to Chile's 
own political values and sovereignty. Four presidential elections later, Allende would 
come to power, complete the nationalization of the copper industry, and begin trading with 
communist countries. The political developments surrounding the copper industry greatly 
influenced Chile's internal political climate. This section outlines those developments 
beginning with 1950 until 1964, before the most drastic measures towards full 
nationalization were taken. The three political leaders that assumed power during this 
given time frame espoused particular ideologies regarding the copper MNCs and 
implemented certain policies that underpinned the bargaining dynamics between the 
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Chilean state and the US MNCs. Bear in mind that the Chilean presidential term lasts for 
six years without subsequent reelection. 
The interesting twist underlying the Chilean copper case is US government involvement. 
From the onset, copper was seen as a 'strategic resource' for the US. Hence Chile became 
a strategic country for the US. 
The US government had four objectives in Chile: (i) ensure continued supply of large 
amounts of copper for national stockpile (ii) assure better treatment for US copper MNCs, 
namely Anaconda and Kennecott, specifically related to tax discrimination and exchange 
control policies (iii) prevent the USSR from purchasing copper from Chile, and extending 
its communist influence in the country (iv) aid Chile in abating its precarious inflation 
level. 121 At the time, there were rumors that the USSR was ready to purchase large 
amounts of Chilean surplus copper. 122 At the time, Chile's aim was to maximize revenues 
from the US copper MNCs and obtain as much foreign exchange from copper profits as 
possible. 123 In June 1950, the US government set the price of copper at 24.5 cents per 
pound. Outraged, Chile demanded a price increase at the Washington Conference of 
1951.124 To pacify Chilean demands, the US opted to allow 20% of Chilean sales, referred 
to as "free sales", to be placed on the European market at whatever price Chile desired.125 
Chile was able to market its copper at 55 cents per pound on the European market. The 
increased revenues further enticed Chile to rid the US from its copper industry and gain full 
control over all decisions regarding its economic growth. The agreement also stipulated 
that US MNCs would expand production in Chile to increase US supply, and also forbade 
Chilean sales to the Soviet bloc. 126 
Before ending his term in 1952, President Gabriel Gonzalez abandoned the consensus 
reached at the Washington Conference and made the first major attempt towards 
independencia a state monopoly over 100%, not 20%, of copper sales. While Gonzalez's 
approach was well intended and politically popular, his reforms failed because the Chilean 
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state lacked experience and expertise in "free market" interaction, such as international 
marketing, building new commercial and trade partners, and identifying international 
demand.127 Unversed in the dealings of the international market, Chile accumulated a 
massive surplus of copper. 128 Diminishing sales caused the Chilean copper industry to 
decline rapidly causing its share of world production to drop nearly half from what it was at 
the end of the war to 14% in 1954. 129 Likewise, absolute returns also fell. Taxation 
requirements for Anaconda and Kennecott had reached 92% prior to the change, which had 
secured a substantial amount of revenue for the Chilean government. Now, without this 
revenue, Chile's economy was in jeopardy. 130 
At the end of 1952, Carlos Ibanez was voted into power on a purely populist platform, 
predominantly supported by working classes and trade unions. Yet hyper-inflation forced 
Ibanez to leave his populist position and enforce harsher and more conservative policies. l3I 
Chilean copper revenues had dropped with the end of the Korean War, and inflation had 
risen to 71% in 1954 and 84% in 1955. 132 
Despite Gonzalez's revolutionary movement away from dependency only three years prior, 
Ibanez entirely overturned the ideal. In 1955, Chile returned to the bargaining table and 
introduced the Nuevo Trato, or the "New Deal", for US mining MNCs. The Nuevo Trato 
called for regulated corporate behavior, targeted at attracting new investment and regaining 
its share of the world copper market. In order to do so, the Chilean government had to 
lower the tax rate and eliminate the artificially imposed exchange rate which was about 
one-sixth the free rate. 133 The state was able to attach a surtax of 25% which would 
gradually lower as production increased. 134 This was intended to encourage the companies 
to expand their production. Additionally, the deal allowed for an accelerated depreciation 
rate for all new investments. All of these legislations were created to make an attractive 
investment climate that would encourage multinationals to expand their current investments, 
make new investments, and increase production. (See Appendix 3A) However, the Chilean 
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balance of payments was sti II based on the production of one resource and the decisions 
involving production were still entirely controlled by foreigners, ensuring that the copper 
MNCs would move to the political forefront in the near future. 135 
The legislation also accounted for another oversight not previously considered by the state. 
One of Anaconda's key mine holdings, Potrerillos, exhausted in the early 1950s. Another 
mme, Salvador, was to replace Potrerillos, but the state needed Anaconda's investment 
to make it productive. The new mine was essential to maintaining the level of production 
that had sustained Chile's economy for decades. J 36 This was a key reason underlying the 
rationale for such liberal legislation. This indicates that the state was still dependent on the 
MNCs for the financial capital and technical expertise involved in developing a new mine. 
With all things in their favor, US MNCs confidently entered negotiations and were granted 
all requested concessions, including a lower tax rate at 50%.137 Hence, the first step 
towards independencia resulted in a great leap backward towards dependencia. Sentiments 
of dependencia were reinforced and Chilean moral reached a new low. 
The 1958 presidential election shocked the Chilean bourgeoisie and the US government and 
the US multinationals. Jorge Alessandri won the election with 31.6% of the total votes 
(389,909 votes), followed by a close second by Salvador Allende with 28.5% of the total 
votes (356,493 votes), and Eduardo Frei, who would win the 1964 election, came in third 
with 20.5% of the votes (255,769 votes).138 Although their candidate had won the election, 
a Marxist had come very close to winning the election. Clearly revolutionary change was 
lingering in the near future. The election also marked the beginning of a highly polarized 
political society. 
At this point, Chile was the country with the seventh largest American investment in the 
world, predominantly in copper mines ($483 million out of $736 million total investment in 
1958).139 And American investment comprised 80% of all foreign investment in the 
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country.140 Prior to the 1958 election, the US had considered Chile to be one of its 
strongest allies in Latin America, yet the marginal loss of the Socialist party invoked 
apprehension, both economically and politically. The following year, Fidel Castro came to 
power in Cuba. The US, in the heat of the Cold War, massively increased its support to the 
Alessandri regime--politically, technically, financially and culturally.141 
The election results also concerned investors. As the political fervor behind the copper 
industry continued to escalate, the US-based copper l'vlNCs grew nervous. The two l'vlNCs 
assumed two starkly different positions. Anaconda was unwilling to divest or relinquish 
sole control over its holdings and opted to increase its investments and expand production. 
In sharp contrast, Kennecott realized the precariousness of the situation and sought out 
ways to minimize possible risks by divesting itself from Chilean operations. 142 The l'vlNC 
wanted to reach an agreement with the Chilean state that would minimize the potential risks 
while providing the financial backing needed to continue with production. 143 
The Alessandri regime continued with the policies of Ibanez, strictly enforcing a free 
market principle and further opening its borders to foreign capital investment. US investors 
and politicians were well pleased with Alessandri' s "gro\\th and stability" program. 
Between 1950 and 1959, the earnings of the major American NINCs increased their 
earnings by 90%.144 Alessandri saw an increase in foreign investment as a surefire way to 
prevent inflation rates from rising. In order to attract more foreign investment, Alessandri 
issued a revamping of Chile's infrastructure which required massive state expenditures. To 
pay for these extensive renovations, Alessandri requested foreign loans from his American 
allies. Chile's foreign debt rose from $569 million when Alessandri took office in 1958 to 
$1896 million when he left office in 1964. 145 American NINCs forged strong linkages to 
Chilean monopolies creating a surge of private capital. 146 This was encouraged by 
favorable profit repatriation and a benign tax scheme. Hence, Chile was once again tangled 
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in a web of dependency spurred by the various policies involving the US multinationals 
14~ 
corporations and the US government. I 
American assistance allowed Alessandri' s growth program to be successful, but only 
superficially and briefly. Copper production increased considerably, however the low base 
production figure allowed the MNCs to expand production without having to increase their 
investments. 148 With lowered tax rates and expanded production, the companies accrued 
massive profits under the Alessandri regime, while investing minimally back into the 
Chilean economy. The Alessandri government attempted to pressure US copper companies 
to increase their investments and involve Chile in the more advanced levels of copper 
production to make Chile more self-sufficient. Yet as production increased, the major 
copper companies remained vertically integrated and Chilean nationalists adamantly called 
for expropriation of the MNCS. 149 Both Anaconda and Kennecott, rather than investing in 
Chile, opted to invest in new refineries back in the US, which when discovered, further 
infuriated the Chilean people. 150 Although Chilean tax revenues increased almost 300%, 
nationalists complained about the doubling of profits the companies enjoyed. 151 Opposition 
towards ]'viNCs became a popular platform, as well as a politically useful and powerful tool 
for politicians and nationalists. 152 
The position of the MNCs must also be considered. Even though the MNCs accrued large 
profits under Alessandri, the election results foreshadowed an uncertain political climate as 
did the increasing demands among Chilean nationalists for expropriation. The l'v1NCs, 
particularly Kennecott, grew fearful of possible expropriation. Expanding investments in 
such a politically volatile climate that directly threatened their investments was not a risk 
the MNCs were willing to take. The MNCs recognized that their bargaining power against 
the state was once again diminishing. 
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3.3. The 1960's: Towards Nationalization 
The social backdrop of the 1960s helps to contextualize the events that followed regarding 
the copper industry and the domestic political climate that prevailed over the following 
decade. Chile had reached a level of economic development that, although not industrial, 
placed it farther ahead of most of the developing world. Yet ironically, it was this semi-
periphery status that frustrated Chileans, resulting in the constant critique of the country's 
economy and society and a persistent dissatisfaction with its intermediary position.IS3 This 
dissatisfaction was expressed primarily during its presidential elections. With an overall 
level of literacy at 84%, the Chilean populace was broadly educated, politically conscious, 
and aware of the injustices in their society.154 The population saw economic development 
as the panacea to its social ills. Hence, copper, the basis of Chile's economy, became a 
central issue in the upcoming electoral debates and the country united under a banner of 
nationalism. 155 Chileans called for expanded production, domestic refining, and most 
importantly, a greater share in the profits which would require greater national control. 156 
On the global political front, the revolution in Cuba was well underway and the 
nationalistic movement within Chile frightened the US government and US investors who 
strategically could not afford a communist revolution in Chile. Around this time, the US 
Congress created the Hickenlooper amendment that stipulated that the US government 
would immediately halt all bilateral aid to any country that expropriated US investments 
without providing fair compensation. 157 Yet, this amendment only heightened 
confrontation from the developing world that attacked the amendment as too economically 
aggressive, making its implementation ineffective. I58 As frustrations and resentment grew 
in Chile, the US needed a more liberal alternative to abate the population and disguise its 
own hidden agenda. 159 
The US found this alternative in Eduardo Frei, of the Christian Democratic Party. The US 
shifted its support from the conservative Right to the moderate Left. It was not so much 
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that the US particularly liked Frei; he simply represented the better of two evils- the worse 
evil being the ever persistent and present Socialist Party candidate, Salvador Allende. 
Communists and socialists supported Allende's calls for immediate nationalization, yet 
Chile was still callow in its technical and management capacity, and such radical measures 
would ensure a loss in markets, technology, and investment capital that was needed to 
develop its own refining capacity.160 The middle-ground man, Eduardo Frei introduced a 
more moderate anti-multinational policy, known as "Chileanization". 
US MNCs also supported Frei, hoping for some form of a compromise with the state under 
Frei that would undoubtedly be better than the complete expropriation of their investments 
under an uncompromising Allende. To the great relief of US MNCs, the US government, 
and the members of the Chilean Right who withdrew their support from their more 
conservative candidate to prevent a Communist victory (in fact the conservative candidate 
withdrew from the race to support Frei), Eduardo Frei and the Christian Democratic Party 
won the 1964 elections by an overwhelming majority of 56%, an absolute majority of 
support and a huge victory given Chile's multi-party political scheme. 16! 
3.4. Frei and Copper, 1964-1970 
Frei's 'Chileanization' program sought to accomplish similar objectives of the Nuevo Trato 
through formal negotiations with the MNCS. 162 His primary objectives were to obtain 
majority state ownership of the mines, increase Chilean production to 1 million tons, and 
refine all copper in the country.163 
The US government supported Frei and his reforms. His defeat over Marxist Salvador 
Allende made him the best hope of abating the communist movement within the country. 
Frei's Chileanization was more moderate than the initiatives proposed by the socialist and 
communist parties, who called for immediate nationalization and expropriation. 164 His 
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policies, however, were the harbinger for the nationalization process that was fully 
undergone by Allende six years later. 
Chileanization of copper called for 51 % of ownership to be sold to the Chilean state. To 
encourage the compliance of the l'v1NCs, Frei offered tax reductions and more flexible 
regulations on profit remittances. Frei's initiatives were quickly pushed forward by the 
sudden decision of Kennecott to sell the majority share (51 %) of its largest Chilean 
subsidiary, EI Teniente, the world's largest underground copper mine. This came as a 
shock to everyone, including the Frei administration and Anaconda. For the first time in 
Chile's history, the Chilean state held some ownership of its O\\1n copper mine, and 
unimaginably, it was suddenly majority ownership. In fact, it was the first time any other 
entity aside from a US-based multinational had held any percentage of ownership of a 
major Chilean copper mine. 
The basic agreements were made only six weeks after Frei took office. Kennecott's 
willingness to comply with this new reform made Chileanization appear an immediate 
success. Anaconda could not fathom relinquishing any equities, let alone the majority share 
and thus sovereign control over its internal affairs, to the Chilean or any government. 165 
Kennecott's decision to move into a partnership with the Chilean government was based 
largely on the political and economic instability within Chile and the unpredictable status of 
Chile-US relations. Kennecott's reaction to Chileanization was also largely motivated by 
the foresight that it could not rely on the US government for potentially crucial support in 
the future. 166 
Essentially, Kennecott relinquished its holdings to the Chilean state because of the 
uncertainties of its investments and because at the time obtaining a fair compensation 
seemed likely. Conscious of its declining bargaining position against the state, the MNC 
opted to compromise for fear that it would otherwise lose completely. Fully aware that the 
Frei government was the more compromising alternative to a communist or socialist 
political regime, Kennecott utilized all bargaining leverage it could. The corporation 
proved extremely prudent in the negotiation process to ensure a just compensation that 
165 Ibid, 129. 











would cover its investments. For its first order of business, Kennecott negotiated for the 
51 % purchase price to be calculated after a revaluation of the book value of its investment, 
which raised the value of its investments from $69 million to $160 million, leaving the state 
obligated to pay $81.6 million, an amount that would cover the entire cost of its initial 
investment. 167 Kennecott insured its further investments with the US AID Investment 
Guarantee Program and tactfully finessed the Chilean state into guaranteeing $110 million 
dollars for all expansions in production. 168 Additionally, Kennecott received a loan for $45 
million for future production from European and Asian copper consumers and banks. 169 
While Kennecott appeared to fully participate in the Chileanization program as a genuine 
'partner' of Chile, in reality, Kennecott refrained from personally funding any new 
investments and making further commitments in Chile, preparing itself for the worst 
possible scenario--the risk of expropriation. At the same time, by ensuring production 
through loans from various countries the US, Europe, and Japan - the risk of 
expropriation for the Chilean state would be much higher. 170 This proved a critical 
component to the eventual compensation that ensued under Pinochet. Kennecott also 
maintained management control of its projects. 171 
While Kennecott pulled out of Chile, Anaconda in contrast, did just the opposite. By the 
time Frei came to power, Anaconda had become far more involved - 51 % of its total 
production comprised 67% of its total eamings. 172 Anaconda committed to a majority self-
financed expansion program, at $131.25 million. 173 The Ml'JC espoused the same strategy 
d· .. ~ . 1 d . 174 - Irect equity Investment, lorelgn contro, an corporate sovereignty. But 
circumstances had changed and its strategies had not adjusted accordingly. Ultimately, 
Anaconda either lacked the foresight of Kennecott to predict the political upheaval that was 
forming, or bel ieved that the power of the MN C was stronger than that of the state. 
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Under Chileanization, Kennecott received a lower tax rate for its profits from production 
and a larger book value on its remaining 49 percent of shares. It actually generated higher 
profits, fomenting greater disapproval among the Chilean populace. Chilean disapproval 
escalated again when the price of copper rose on the international market and the US 
MNCs retained a lower price for copper sold to the US. The Kennecott-Frei agreement was 
arranged at 29 cents per pound at the time of the deal, yet three years later, primarily 
because of the Vietnam War, copper was sold on the London Metals Exchange for 90 cents 
per pound. However, the price of Chilean copper exported by Kennecott was deliberately 
kept lower for the US government. 175 This further outraged Chilean nationalists, and in 
1967, the Chilean government assumed full control over copper pricing, and based it on the 
London Exchange price. Yet this increase in price, coupled with the expansion in 
production and the lower tax rate, only increased profits for the foreign MNCs. Profits 
doubled from 1965 to 1966, and doubled again in 1967. 176 
Since 1910, when the US MNCs first invested in the Chilean copper industry, billions of 
dollars had left Chile in profits. Between 1953 and 1968 US copper MNCs made a profit 
of$I,036 million and only reinvested $71 million back to Chile, including new investments. 
(See Appendix 4A) Likewise, these MNCs did little to generate employment or spur 
growth in other sectors of the economy. As the fabrication and the refining were done 
outside of Chile, the MNCs exported mostly raw copper. Frei also wanted to increase 
copper production, and as part of the plan, US MNCs agreed to double production between 
1966 and 1972 as part of an expansion program. Yet, the primary funding of this 
expansion program came from the Chilean state. The Chilean government guaranteed all 
loans that were from the Export-Import banks which covered 75% of expenditures, as well 
as making 23% of direct contributions. That left the companies with only 2% to finance the 
expansion program themselves.177 Under the Frei regime, Anaconda made $426 million in 
profits and Kennecott made $178 million. 178 Needless to say, the corporations greatly 
benefited under Chileanization. 
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However, Chileans also benefited immensely. Under Chileanization, Chileans gained the 
valuable experience, expertise and confidence in the copper industry. By 1966, Chileans 
began to fill top management positions, learning the inner dealings of marketing, 
construction, finance, and sales-the very aspects of the production cycle that had caused 
their downfall in 1952. Kennecott reported having only two Americans of its 10,000 
employees working in Chile. Additionally, the copper refining process within Chile had 
tripled under the program. 179 But the most significant aspect of the production process that 
Chile seized control of was setting the international price policy.I80 Overall, the Chileans 
were reclaiming the copper industry as their own and doing so with tremendous success. 
Chilean competency nurtured a sentiment throughout the nation that dependencia was 
nearly over. No longer were MNCs needed for economic growth and development. The 
large US MNCs were perceived as contributing very little to the country's welfare and the 
advantages of being in full control of the copper industry were more enticing than ever 
before. Alas, Chile could taste independence, and act as the sovereign power in control of 
its own destiny. 
Production was thriving when the first attack by the Chilean government on Anaconda 
occurred. The government imposed a new surtax, arguing that the inviolability clause of 
the past no longer applied. Both the Chilean government and the MNCs realized that the 
bargaining power of the multinationals was declining quickly. Their investments were 
sunk and their role in the local economy was no longer needed. Output was an all time 
high and Chileanization had been successful for all parties, yet Chileans argued they should 
relish even more fully in the benefits. 181 The nation was ripe for the full take over of the 
industry-the time for nacionalizacion had arrived. 182 
In 1969, 80% of the Anaconda Copper Company's profits from its global investments came 
from Chile. IS3 Frei called Anaconda to the bargaining table and pushed for Chileanization, 
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usmg the Kennecott 51 % equity partnership as the model. Yet, because of its recent 
financial commitments, Anaconda refused to concede control over production. 
Frei persisted on Anaconda's nationalization till the end of his of term. In 1969, the last 
year of his term, Frei was able to increase taxes significantly. Frei was motivated to take 
further measures before the end of his term primarily because of the internal politics within 
his own party whose members began advocating for full nationalization, but also by the 
increasing demands from the electorate and the high price of copper, which had stabilized 
at 62 cents per pound. 184 Hence, Frei during his state-of-the nation address in May of 1969, 
stated the following: " .. .I consider it necessary that the copper companies that have not 
participated in the past in the Chileanization program now enter into it in order that this 
policy, which was proposed to the country and which it approved in granting me my office, 
may be applied across the board without exception." 185 This served as a warning to 
Anaconda that more drastic measures would be taken if it refused to comply with 
Chileanization. 
Shortly after Frei's address, a twenty-four hour student strike was held, demanding the full 
nationalization of the Anaconda mines. 186 Although Frei had already entered into 
negotiations with Anaconda, a number of bills from the left and Frei's own party were 
proposed in Congress calling for nationalization. The political pressure on Frei to 
nationalize was mounting. Theodore Moran, in reference to this point in Chile's history, 
writes "This might be the rare historical moment, many argued, when, through an act of 
national will, the country could end its condition of dependency forever.,,187 
Using the threat of nationalization, Frei brought Anaconda back to the bargaining table. 
Although resistant, Anaconda finally conceded to the joint venture project that Frei 
proposed, granting 51 % of its holdings to the Chilean state. Anaconda's compliance was 
made based on two factors: the threat of nationalization and the adamant pressure from 
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American Ambassador Edward Korry.188 The US government had no intention of assisting 
Anaconda enhance its bargaining leverage against the Chilean state. US pressure eroded 
Anaconda's bargaining position by coercing the MNC to meet the demands of the Chilean 
state, regardless of the best interest of the MNC. Additionally, because Kennecott had 
agreed to Chileanization, it was virtually impossible for Anaconda alone to obtain the 
support of the US government against the Chilean state, particularly when US concern 
foremost revolved around an ideological battle and not a corporate one. 189 
Hoping to ease the political furor in Congress, in his party, and among the public, Frei 
called the final agreement an "agreed upon nationalization" (in Spanish: nacionalizacion 
pactada).190 The plan, in reality, was immediate Chileanization with the possibility of 
nationalization later. It essentially took the form of a fade-out divestment scheme. 191 The 
plan included the buyout of 51 % of Anaconda's holdings of the book value that would be 
paid from the profits of the mines over the next 12 years, and allowing Anaconda to remain 
in charge of marketing, sales and overall management. 192 Management control proved a 
critical point in the bargaining agreements of both Kennecott and Anaconda. For the MNC, 
control of management assures that the company will not go bankrupt because of 
mismanagement out of its direct control. 193 In fact, as demonstrated by Anaconda, it may 
be willing to forgo ownership for managerial control. The logic behind management 
control is somewhat obscure as the management goals of both the state and the MNC seem 
to be parallel: to maximize profits, production, and efficiency. 194 For the MNC, with a 49% 
share of ownership, control over operations is critical to ensuring its remaining investment. 
The details of the Anaconda-Frei agreement were as follows: Anaconda's three largest 
mines would fall under immediate ownership of the state and payment for the mines would 
begin in June of 1970, one year from the date of the agreement. In 1973, the government 
could purchase the remaining shares after the initial payment for the 51 % had been 
completed. The tax rate would be calculated on a sliding scale depending on the 
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international market price of copper, but would be limited to 70% when the price was over 
50 cents per pound. 195 Anaconda, in exchange for its cooperation, was granted a 
management contract for a fee of one percent of total sales. This was enough to calm the 
general populace, allowing the furious debate over the copper MNCs to subside briefly. 
Indeed, for Chile, the nationalization of Anaconda meant that the Chilean state for the first 
time in its history had control of its primary industry. In his final year of his presidency, 
Eduardo Frei declared Anaconda's nationalization a "second independence.,,196 Weeping 
in public, Chilean Minister of Mines Alejandro Hales claimed he had "fulfilled a lifelong 
dream.,,197 
This agreement was the symbolic departure from dependence. The majority ownership had 
been achieved in the most important and symbolic deposits: Chuquicamata, El Teniente and 
Salvador.198 Likewise, the success of the agreement was demonstrated tangibly through the 
massive economic gains of the state, which leapt from $200 million in 1968 to $353 million 
in 1969 after negotiations. 199 
Anaconda's displeasure with the settlement caused it to retaliate, but the MNC had very 
limited bargaining power. It did, however, after agreeing to Chileanization in 1969, extract 
only the most easily available and high-quality ore and did little to preserve the 
maintenance of the mines?OO Later, Allende would try to hold Anaconda accountable for 
its apathetic practices when determining the final compensation figures. 
Economically, Frei's term and Chileanization were a huge success. The balance of 
payments, by the support of US AID and the high global market price for copper which at 
one point reached an exceptional 98 cents per pound, submerged from its prior debt. This 
also helped reduce and more or less stabilize the rate of inflation?OI Nevertheless, a more 
radical leader from a more radical party was gaining political popularity, and indication that 
the majority of Chileans was dissatisfied with Frei's performance and wanted more from its 
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political leadership. Frei became a controversial figure, and both the left and right found 
fault with his programs. The left argued that his policies espoused neo-capitalism by being 
excessively generous with compensation had further empowered US multinationals and 
reinforced Chile's dependence. 202 The right argued that Frei's policies raised the 
expectations of the left that only an expanded role of the state could fulfill, thus opening the 
door for a Marxist leader to assume power.203 
3.5. The US and Frei, ]964-1970 
The US government still had vital strategic interests in Chile's copper industry and pursued 
arrangements that would allow them to satisfy domestic needs. In 1966, President Lyndon 
Johnson offered a loan for $10 million over 40 years at less than 1 % interest from the 
Agency for International Development (AID) in exchange for allowing Anaconda to sell 
100,000 tons of copper to the US at the domestic producer's price, 36 cents per pound, 
when the price was over double on the London Metal Exchange (LME).204 President Frei 
agreed, however, soon after the transaction went through, he pushed the MNCs to sell at the 
LME price in order to garner higher profits. The companies assented, based on the 
rationale that they would be taxed the same regardless.2os Yet official US interests moved 
beyond strategic interests in the industry during Frei's term as the threat of communism 
became a closer reality. 
Starting with Frei's campaign and lasting through his term in power, US involvement in 
Chilean internal affairs heightened. Official reports taken after the 1973 coup by the US 
government indicate the extent of US involvement. Over 50% of Frei's campaign funds, 
approximately $2.6 million, during the 1964 election came directly from the CIA. 
Additionally, the US resources influenced the 1965 and 1969 congressional election 
outcomes. The US also created and supported a propaganda campaign using non-
communist papers, such as El Mercurio Chile's most widespread daily paper.206 During 
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Frei's term the US is cited to have interfered extensively using various techniques, such as 
the media, private sector organizations, local political parties, local elections, local 
institutions, and eventually through the support of a military COUp?07 
The US government also helped to make Chileanization a success. The US allowed for a 
$200 million loan to be granted from the Export-Import Bank for copper expansion 
programs. The US Treasury, although not recorded to having pressured Kennecott to 
relinquish ownership as adamantly with Anaconda, did allow for the corporation to use 
losses from South African gold-mining operations during the 1950's to lessen the capital 
gains tax liabilities from the sales of its holdings,z°8 Yet the most significant US aid came 
from both the government and private investors under a development aid program known 
as the Alliance for Progress. 
Shortly after John Kennedy began his presidency, he created the Alliance for Progress 
which was created to assist in social and economic development throughout the continent 
so as to prevent communist movements or alliances with the Soviet Union?09 The specific 
intention was to demonstrate that democratic governments and open economies could 
achieve the same social reform that Marxists claimed could only be realized under 
communism. The grant was set at $20 billion over ten years to assist in mostly social 
reforms, specifically housing, education, and land tenure. Half the amount was guaranteed 
by the US government, and the other half from private sources within the US. In order to 
encourage US multinationals to invest more in the region, the US government extended its 
Agency for International Development (AID) Investment Guarantee Program to Latin 
America, with a guarantee of US financial backing in case of expropriation,z1O Thus, the 
Alliance for Progress had dual purposes: to protect its investments in Latin America (the 
economic component) and to quell the threat of communism that was in full force in Cuba 
(the political component). The US government believed that furthering economic alliances 
would generate the political loyalty of Latin American countries, and reinforce the ideals of 
an open, free market economy. 
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Because of its long standing commitment to constitutional democracy, and for fear of a 
radical political change in the near future, Chile, under Frei, became the testing ground for 
the Alliance.21I The platform of the Christian Democratic Party seemingly paralleled the 
tenets of the Alliance, calling for social reform within a democratic context. Yet Sigmund 
addresses the conflicts that arise for the US government between supporting a reformist 
democratic government and defending US investments, namely protecting the interests of 
the copper companies and supporting the partial nationalization process initiated under Frei 
through Chileanization.212 
Frei openly welcomed the Alliance for Progress, re-emphasizing Kennedy's words: "Those 
who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.,,213 For 
Frei, the Alliance coincided with his primary objectives for economic development, 
redistribution of income, and utilizing foreign capital for the growth of the national 
economy_ 214 In order to uphold the principles of its electoral platform, the Christian 
Democratic Party needed to integrate groups that felt marginalized in the political process, 
and by doing so, suppress revolutionary sentiments and expand their political support 
base.215 For both Frei and the US government, this was a critical objective of the Alliance. 
As Alessandri's excessive spending had left the country highly desperate for foreign 
exchange, Chile gladly accepted the financial support of the US, becoming the principal 
recipient of aid under the Alliance.216 
Coinciding with the Alliance for Progress' social reform goals, land redistribution and 
agrarian reform were central components to Frei's social agenda. However, the US 
government's support of social reform in Chile, particularly land reform, hurt MNC 
position with conservative business groups who were the major land-owning members of 
society. Previously, these groups had been aligned with US interests, and Anaconda and 
Kennecott had been able to rely on the political backing of these groups. However, when 
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the US government threw its support behind Frei's reform process, the conservatives 
retaliated against the US-based copper MNCs, politically tying guarantees for the MNC 
rights with the ending of the land reform process. Yet the land reform program persisted, 
and in 1969, the conservative National Party declared it would not support Anaconda 
against the government's majority control takeover.217 The once ardent domestic allies of 
the MNCs turned against them, and traditional upper classes took the lead in the movement 
to restrict MNC activities.218 The conservative resentment towards US policy was most 
blatantly realized when Allende's nationalization process was unanimously passed in the 
Congress, despite the fact that the majority seats were held by Christian Democrats and 
conservatives.219 US government support for land reform essentially cost the MNCs the 
political backing they had in the country?20 
Financial aid was also provided through official US foreign aid programs. Between 1962 
and 1969, Chile received more than one billion US dollars in direct assistance, the highest 
per capita financial aid in Latin America. In 1968, food donations from both the public and 
private sectors of the US fed 25% of the Chilean popUlation. In 1966, the Johnson 
administration negotiated the sale of 100,000 tons of copper to American-based fabricators. 
Additionally, Chile received a $10 million US loan and Anaconda agreed to pay additional 
taxes of$3.5 million.221 
The consequences of supporting the various reform programs, although not intentional on 
behalf of the US government, severely weakened the bargaining leverage of the MNCs. US 
government actions attest that MNC interests were not a priority on its agenda. For Frei 
and the Chilean people, the MNCs represented a dominant foreign force that obstructed in 
the social reform goals of the state, economically, politically, and psychologically. The US 
government also supported Frei's social reform program, a stance that was inherently 
incompatible with the position of the MNCs. 222 Therefore, the US government had to 
choose which greater evil to fight and based its decision on the greater political concern, 
that being the spread of communism and not on the private interests of the MNCs. As one 
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seeks to interpret the reasons behind the US anti-communist furor, the long term economic 
concerns that underpin communism and challenge the doctrine of capitalism and an open 
economic system may have been the pith of US concerns. The more important point, 
however, is that the immediate economic concerns of particular US-based corporations was 
not a priority, nor were the benefits that come with having national corporations abroad, 
such as a lower copper price. 
3.6. The 1970 Elections 
By the time the 1970 elections began, Chile was on the precipice of nationalization and 
moving full-speed toward this fate, a phenomenon some scholars call the "ratchet effeet.,,223 
Even the right supported nationalization. Radomiro T omie, the Christian Democratic 
candidate, voiced dissatisfaction with the Chileanization Program, calling for 
nationalization of the copper industry with equitable compensation for the creation of a 
"New Economy".224 And Jorge Alessandri, the most conservative candidate and long time 
ally of Anaconda, even vowed to proceed forward with nationalization.225 As the industry 
had been largely nationalized by Frei, it was clear that no political party, regardless of its 
political position, would continue to accept any foreign ownership over the mines. 226 
Clearly, the M0rCs had lost all bargaining power. 
The fundamental difference between Allende's policy and that of Tomic was over 
compensation; the extreme left called for little to none, while Tomic supported fair 
compensation?27 This ideological difference caused the critical centrist party, the Radical 
party, to join into an alliance with the socialist and communist parties forming the Unidad 
Popular. 
In the 1970 Presidential election, there were three major candidates: former President Jorge 
Allessandri on the right, the moderate Tomie of the Christian Democrat Party, and the 
Marxist Allende, the fourth time representative of the Unidad Popular coalition of the left. 
No candidate won an absolute majority; Allende won 36.1 percent of the votes followed 
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closely by Alessandri with 34.9 percent. Congress was left with the final decision, and it 
was ultimately the centrist Christian Democrats who threw their support behind Allende 
which decided the election.228 
3.7 Allende and Copper, 1970-1973 
In 1970, Salvador Allende became the first democratically elected Marxist President in 
history. Chilean economist Alberto Baltra has estimated that over the last thirty years prior 
to Allende's nationalization, the copper MNCs had derived over $2 billion in net profits, 
tantamount to 40 percent of the total value of copper exports over that time and three times 
the total amount reinvested in Chile. 229 Upon entering office on November 3, 1970, 
Allende immediately began to implement the copper nationalization program that Unidad 
Popular had promised during the electoral campaign. 
The amendment included a number of provisions, including compensation over a thirty 
year period with at least three percent interest on the book value. However, the various 
costs borne from "amortization, depreciation, fines, exhaustion of mines, and reduced value 
due to obsolescence" were to be deducted from the due compensation, in addition to "all or 
part of the excess profits which those enterprises may have obtained.,,230 Any revaluations 
of the book value after 1964 were to be excluded in order to reduce the generous increase in 
book value Kennecott had been granted under the Chileanization of El Teniente.231 The 
amendment also limited the number of appeals the IYINCs could make regarding the 
decided compensation. Furthermore, Allende was permitted to call a plebiscite if the bill 
?3? 
was not passed by Congress.- -
The most controversial aspect of the amendment was the excess profits clause.233 Congress 
granted Allende full power to calculate the excess on profits as well as conduct the 
negotiations with the MNCs in whatever manner he deemed appropriate. Allende's 
calculations began in 1955 when accurate records were maintained by the state and based 
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average profits on the world market prices. MNCs were denied the right to appeal the 
president's final decision on excess profits.234 
During this time, a number of state decisions regarding copper sales and production took 
place. In February 1971, Chile decided to sell copper directly to China.235 In April 1971, 
the Chilean Copper Corporation (Codelco), the newly formed state copper corporation, 
took over the sale and distribution of Anaconda's copper mines. Near the time of the 
amendment vote, all distribution of El Tienente, the largest copper mine controlled by 
Kennecott, came under control of the state.236 These actions demonstrated that the newly 
empowered state could choose to act completely autonomously. 
Allende made copper nationalization a constitutional amendment In order to avoid any 
controversy about earlier agreements made under Chileanization. 237 On July 16, 1971, 
Allende's copper nationalization legislation was unanimously passed in the name of 
"national sovereignty".238 To Article 10 of the Chilean Constitution the following was 
added: "Being demanded by national interest and in exercise of the sovereign and 
inalienable right of the State to freely use its wealth and natural resources, the foreign 
companies forming the great mining are nationalized and incorporated to the full and 
exclusive dominion of the Nation ..... 239 Allende's copper nationalization project was 
established as Law 17,540.240 
At the point of their departure from Chile, Anaconda and Kennecott book value holdings 
totaled over $500 million, the largest investors in Chile, with Anaconda's holdings more 
significant than those of Kennecott.241 The compensation factor was the harshest manner 
through which the Allende regime exerted its power over the MNCs. Firstly, in September 
234 Ibid", 150. 
235 Roxborough et aL, 90. 
236 Ibid., 93. 
237 Sigmund, Multinationals in Latin America, ISO. 
238 Theodore H. Moran, "Transnational Strategies of Protection and Defense by Multinational Corporations: 
Spreading the Risk and Raising the Cost for Nationalization in Natural Resources." International 
Organization, VoL 27, No.2. (Spring, 1973): 280 [Electronic]. Available from JSTOR at: 
http://links.jstor.orgisici?sici=0020-8183%28197321%2927%3A2%3C273%3ATSOPAD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-
V 
Corporaci6n Nacional del Cobre de Chile (CODELCO), [Online]. Accessed 011 January 10,2006. Note: 
This statement was a transitory disposition in the Constitution. 
240 Ibid., [Online]. Accessed on January 10,2006. 











of 1971, the government increased the excess profits tax to $774 million, exceeding the 
book value of the companies' total investments by $200 million. In October of 1971, the 
state announced that no compensation would be granted to the corporations. By the end of 
1971, Chile defaulted on a number of its payments abroad, amongst which included those 
to Anaconda under the 1969 agreement.242 
3.8. US Action, 1970-1973 
For clarification purposes, the central focus of this study is the bargaining process that took 
place between the copper multinationals and the Chilean state. Although the impact of the 
US government in Chile is not the primary emphasis of this study, understanding the 
influence of the US government on MNC power is critical. It is important to distinguish 
the interests and tactics of the US government and those of the US corporations, although 
divorcing the motives of one institution from the other may be difficult as both shared 
vested interests in the political and economic welfare of the country. Often the actions of 
the MNCs dovetailed nicely with the policies of the US government; however, how their 
individual motives diverged sheds valuable insight to understanding the weakening 
bargaining position of the MNCs relative to the Chilean state. For this paper, the "US" 
should be interpreted as both the US government and US multinationals as one unit, but 
when specified apart should be understood as separate entities with distinct motives. 
The political history of Chile has become world famous mostly for its Marxist roots and the 
US government's intervention to destroy it. Yet what occurred between the US MNCs and 
the US government in Chile also illuminates US foreign policy decisions and how it 
defends US foreign investment, as well as the extent to which MNCs can rely on the 
support of their home government to defend private interests. 
It is widely accepted that the US was involved in the overthrow of Allende, although the 
extent of this intervention is contentious. The US government had dual interests in the 
region: to protect its investments and to prevent a communist domino effect throughout 
Latin America. As US-based MNCs held massive investments throughout the region, the 
firms were equally concerned about the political influence of the spread of communism that 
would most likely manifest into the expropriation of all investments. 











Allende's plurality victory infuriated Washington. On September 8 and again on September 
14 the "40 Committee", the interagency committee that selects US foreign covert activities, 
met to discuss what government action would be taken prior to the October 24 
congressional decision. After failed attempts to devise political stratagems, the Committee 
turned to the CIA and the notion of forming a military COUp.243 US President Nixon 
informed Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms that the United States would 
not accept an Allende regime in power and instructed him to coordinate a military coup 
d'etat in Chile.244 6.5 million dollars was spent during 1970 and 1973 as part of the US 
government's covert actions in Chile.245 The coup was designed to overthrow Allende 
prior to the Congressional election. Yet the plot collapsed, and Allende assumed his 
rightful office as president of Chile.246 
The US government could have intervened directly through a military invasion; however, 
the financial costs would have been immense and could have generated widespread dissent 
towards the US that would produce the reverse effect. Thus, the US government 
approached the situation under a second strategy geared to undermine the structure of the 
Chilean economy, fully aware that Chile's dependence on the US would enable them to 
succeed.247 This tactic, however, was not supported by the MNCs for fear that exacerbating 
the domestic economy would only impair their chances to receive a fair settlement248 For 
this study, the extent of US involvement is critical insofar as corporate interests are 
concerned. US actions, or lack thereof, towards the MNCs greatly affected the bargaining 
leverage of the US MNCs. 
The US and the Chilean economies were connected on a number of levels. The US was the 
largest purchaser of Chilean copper, and also held substantial investments in several key 
industries. The US was also the primary source of the majority of imports, including raw 
materials and machinery that churned the industrial production of the country. Additionally, 
the US was a key player in various international institutions that determined the refinancing 
243 US State Department, [Online]. 
244 Ibid., [Online]_ 
m Ibid., [Online]. 
246 Ibid., [Online]. 
247 Roxborough et aI., 99. 











of Chile's massive debts. As private investment was predominantly in copper, the MNCs 
were also a critical link between the two countries. 
Allende took a very harsh and confrontational stance against the copper MNCs. He argued 
that excess profits had been taken from Chile and therefore would not concede 
compensation. Therefore, it was Allende's parsimonious compensatory policies that 
enraged the US NINCs, rather than nationalization itself.249 When Allende announced the 
terms of compensation for the expropriated copper companies, Anaconda and Kennecott 
pressured the US government to push for immediate and full compensation. Consequently, 
the US government stated that it needed to be more rigorous with its stance towards the 
Allende government.250 Prior to this, the US government had responded to MNC requests 
for intervention by following a "wait and see" policy as the copper MNCs had been 
guaranteed compensation under Frei. The response taken by the US government was to 
make the rolling over of Chilean debt conditional on immediate and full compensation.251 
The US government's response conveniently dovetailed with the larger economic plans 
already put into motion in order to destabilize the Chilean economy. However, the 
fundamental decisions and strategies to combat Allende were made by the US government 
prior to Allende's announcement that it would not compensate the copper companies.252 
This indicates that the US government had committed to a hard line policy towards Chile 
prior to the point when the MNCs approached the US government most forcefully. Stephen 
Krasner furthermore argues that the US government, in order to avoid the pressure and 
demands of the MNCs, purposefully kept the MNCs in the dark about government's covert 
activities. 253 It is reported that the US Ambassador to Chile met with Anaconda and 
projected a positive outlook for Allende's cooperation and full compensation for a 
nationalized industry.254 
As aforementioned, the MNes did not support the economic destabilization program that 
the US government enforced for fear that overturning the domestic economy would reduce 
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the likelihood of compensation. 255 Yet, the US government reacted by suspending all 
financial assistance and loans to Chile in order to debilitate the Chilean economy.256 In 
November of 1970, the highest branches of American government initiated an economic 
program detailed in the National Security Decision Memorandum 93 (NSDM 93)?57 The 
program called for sanctions and an end to all forms of bilateral assistance, credits, and 
loans. The US government manipulated its leadership position in major international 
organizations to produce an economic crisis in Chile. Aid grants dropped from $35 million 
in 1969 to $1.5 million in 1971; Export-Import credits fell from $234 million in 1967 to 
nothing in 1971; Inter-American Development Bank credits declined from $46 million in 
1970 to $3 million in 1971; and the World Bank refrained from providing any loans to 
Chile under Allende. 258 US private sources also withdrew funding from Chile and 
commercial credits fell from $300 million under Frei to $30 million under Allende. The 
US cut the supply of capital stock and spare parts, for which Chile was completely 
dependent, particularly for copper production.259 The US government also began to sell 
copper from its own copper reserves, which lowered prices on the global market and 
decreased Chile's foreign exchange earnings.26o 
The interests of the US government as discussed in Stephen Krasner's final analysis 
indicate that the US government had no vital national interests in the country despite being 
fully conscious of the economic losses that would be sacrificed.261 An Allende government 
did not pose a military threat to the US nor threaten peace to the region, although it would 
inevitably disrupt hemispheric cohesion?62 However, Allende's government would have 
severe political and psychological costs, namely the psychological advancement of 
Marxism in the Latin America and the world. This was clearly the basis for all action taken 
by the US government. Although it is widely accepted that internal forces were the primary 
causes of the 1973 coup and the overthrow of Allende, it cannot be denied that the US 
made a significant effort to influence the political outcomes in Chile?63 
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3.9. The MNCs in Defense of Their Interests 
Anaconda and Kennecott took different approaches to defend their investments. 
Kennecott's defense or safety strategy was thoroughly calculated in anticipation that 
nationalization was inevitable. Anaconda's failure to envisage the seemingly inescapable 
nationalization program or at least accurately gauge their waning bargaining power against 
the state, left it in a far worse position than their copper counterpart. The defense strategies 
applied by Kennecott highlight the capacity of the :MNC to access the various spheres that 
had an affect, or potentially could affect, its bargaining position against the Chilean state, 
namely its home government, the host government directly, and the global political 
economy. By trying to defend through various means, Kennecott evinces that a MNC can 
elevate its bargaining position against the host state through venues that the host 
government may not have access to, most potently in the global system. Although not 
successful in all of its efforts, Kennecott demonstrates that if properly planned and executed, 
MNCs can be successful in defending their interests in scenarios that would otherwise have 
resulted in indeterminable losses, as was the case for Anaconda. 
Both Anaconda and Kennecott joined other :MNCs from various threatened industries, most 
infamously International Telephone and Telegraph (TTT) , in trying to gain the support of 
the US government. Kennecott, unlike Anaconda, quickly recognized that the US 
government would not provide the support needed to protect its investments and 
immediately devised a separate strategy independent of US assistance?64 First it appealed 
locally against Chile's tax judgment, but to no avail. Kennecott also took legal action on 
the basis that without full compensation it was legally entitled to part ownership of the 
mines. When local legal action proved unfruitful, Kennecott went abroad, utilizing every 
international alliance it had.265 Kennecott's goal was to leave Chile with no place to sell its 
nationalized copper.266 The MNC filed lawsuits against Chilean copper consignments in 
France, West Germany, Sweden and Italy. Consequently, Chile's exports declined 7%.267 
The MNC later went to a French court to block payments for a major copper sale to France. 
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Copper sales in France and Sweden were completely suspended by 1973.268 These efforts 
were intended to pressure Chile to pay compensation and by January 1973, copper sales 
were declining dramatically?69 Using its transnational alliances, Kennecott wisely tied the 
interests of its major copper purchasers to financial institutions in Europe, Japan, and the 
US, to a successful compensation from Chile?70 This resulted in increased pressure from 
vital third parties for fair compensation to Kennecott. Because of wise planning under 
Frei's Chileanization and coupled with its tactics in the global arena that indirectly 
challenged the economic competency of the state, Kennecott received more In 
compensation than the total net worth of its holdings.271 
\Vhile Kennecott was devising maneuvers through a number of means, Anaconda relied 
solely on the US government for its backing, a strategy that produced limited results. 
Anaconda focused specifically on a new constitutional amendment that denied access to 
local Chilean courts, for which the MNC hoped the US government would protest on its 
behalen Anaconda executives also requested that US policy-makers grant a government 
loan to compensate the MNC for all nationalized property which would be repaid through 
raw materials.273 Both were rejected under the premise of potential legal complications. 
In 1969, the Investment Guarantee Program under the Agency for International 
Development (AID) became a separate government institution known as the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation COPIC). When Allende nationalized the industries in 1971, 
the agency was immediately hit with the claims of reimbursements by Anaconda and 
Kennecott, as well as ITT.274 This legally held the US government liable for the payments, 
rather than the MNCs. Yet, OPIC only issued notes to cover the losses of Kennecott, who 
had wisely anticipated and legally planned for the possibility of nationalization, while it 
denied coverage to Anaconda, and other major MNCs such as ITT, who had not properly 
foreseen nor prepared in advance for the political revolution in Chile. 
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Kennecott's political and economic tactics were geared towards coercing cooperation from 
the Chilean government; the MNC was not concerned with Allende's political agenda 
except in relation to its investments, namely fair compensation. While its strategies 
disrupted the Chilean economy, its plans were contingent on compensation and not aimed 
at overturning the Chilean economy as was on the agenda of the US government. 
Kennecott's actions demonstrate that J'vfNCs, as principally economic actors, will 
manipulate political circumstances to enhance their individual economic positions. 
Because of its prudent planning, Kennecott managed to secure itself fair compensation 
despite the harsh stance taken by the Chilean state against the MNCs and the lack of 
support from the US government. Anaconda, who had not foreseen nor prepared for the 
worst, consequently suffered the worst. The ?v1NC lost its holdings and the capital it had 
invested under the Frei administration without the possibility of compensation. Allende 
also refused to compensate Anaconda for its property.275 
Kennecott shows that MNCs possess the power to protect their investments and the 
strategies they use to strengthen their bargaining position against the state. Most obviously, 
the greatest advantage Kennecott held over the state was in the greater global environment. 
Anaconda, on the other hand, who had failed to anticipate the situation that would unfold in 
Chile had no other option after losing political support in the host state but to rely on the 
US government as its buttress. For its lack of worthy foresight, Anaconda fared far worse 
than Kennecott in the final compensation. 
3.10. Chilean Politics, 1970-1973 
The end of dependencia is a definitive point in the history of Chile. For Chileans, after a 
long and weary struggle, they were free from the cycle of exploitation, inequity, and 
injustice that had oppressed the country for decades. They had achieved independencia. 
But the story did not end there, and the victory for Chile was neither simple nor complete. 
The political turmoil that unraveled under Allende is not an integral component to this 











study, yet necessary to assess the extent of influence the copper MNCs had in Allende's 
downfall. 
Allende's party, Unidad Popular (UP),276 blamed the country's under-development on two 
factors: Chile's dependence on foreign economic assistance and the control of all means of 
production in private hands. 277 The most revolutionary action taken by the UP was to 
transition Chile away from a capitalist system to a socialist system. The nationalization of 
copper and other critical industries was a pivotal step of that process?78 The UP viewed the 
country's dependency on foreign relations as draining of the country's resources and 
debilitating the country's political sovereignty. Copper revenues in particular were central 
to funding UP objectives, particularly the second revolutionary plan of the UP -- to create a 
worker's state through a major redistribution of income. For Allende, expropriation with 
little or no compensation was a way to achieve a transfer of wealth from the rich to the poor 
- the crux of his economic, political, and social reform.279 If lower classes consumed more, 
he argued, Chilean society would be more egalitarian. Allende's Marxist ideological 
beliefs were to be manifested through his economic reforms. 
:S-ationalization, and his adamancy to a no compensation policy, bore consequences for the 
copper industry and Allende's broader economic program. The state had to fight various 
legal actions taken by Kennecott from various countries. Chile had to find other sources of 
spare parts that the US had provided since the industry developed. 280 Allende's Chile 
managed to maintain access to the European marketing channels that were established by 
the MNCs, but lost its largest consumer of the mineral, the US.281 Chile suffered severely 
from the loss of direct investment capital and the availability of this resource. The UP 
envisioned that newly gained profits from copper exports would cover the costs of 
necessary imports. At this point, copper comprised 70% of the country's total exports. 
Between 1970 and 1971, the price of copper fell from $0.61 USD per pound to $0.40 USD 
per pound, resulting in a loss of $200 million in foreign exchange.282 (See Appendix 5A) 
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For a decline of one cent in price on the interantional market, Chile took a loss of $7 
million?83 Chile's nationalized copper was now entirely based on the London Market 
Exchange (LME) and it immediately felt the effects. This drop in price is primarily 
attributed to a leveling off of global demand,284 but was partly affected by the decision of 
the US to open some of its own copper reserves for sale on the world market which 
increased the copper supply and pushed down the price. 285 The sudden drop in price 
proved disastrous to Allende's economic program?86 Furthermore, there was a worldwide 
increase in food prices, most of which was imported. This led to even greater economic 
losses as the government used its limited funds to cover the food imports thereby increasing 
the debt on the balance of payments. Allende searched for other international recourses to 
provide loans that could finance necessary imports, but to no avail. World Bank loans and 
credit from other financial institutions were allegedly "delayed". Allende attempted to 
denounce the US economic blockade in the United Nations in December of 1972, yet the 
US government's official response was that such decisions were made independent of the 
US as the Allende government lacked credit-worthiness. 287 Indeed, Allende's harsh 
position towards the MNCs had created a perception internationally that the investment 
climate in Chile was hostile?88 
Yet, after the first two years of his term, Allende began to make some progress in acquiring 
funds from abroad. Thus, the economic blockade did not pose as serious of an obstacle for 
the Allende government as it initially appeared. 289 By the beginning of 1973, Allende 
obtained a series of short-term loans, and increased trade from Europe, Japan, and its Latin 
American neighbors?90 Around the same time, the price of copper began to rise allowing 
Chile to regain valuable foreign currency and improve its balance of payments 
difficulties. 291 
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Yet a number of Allende's reform policies backfired. The redistribution of income led to a 
greater demand for goods that the working class could not afford prior to Allende. The 
increased demand for luxury goods created a severe imbalance in the balance of payments 
as the UP needed to retain middle and working class support. As the economic situation 
worsened, the market could no longer satisfy the middle class demands for luxury goods.292 
In 1972, inflation rose to 160% over the cost of living levels in 1971 ?93 In 1972 and 1973, 
Chile held the world record for the severity of its inflation. 294 The explosive rate of 
inflation proved a critical motivational factor for the coup that overthrew Allende's 
government.295 The government could not afford to raise wages and the standard of living 
dec1ined.296 The middle class was incensed. 
The Conservative Right was confident that the Congressional March elections in 1973 
would swing parliamentary power to its side. They anticipated a severe decline in UP 
support and hoped that the combined votes from opposition parties would allow for a two-
thirds opposition majority that could legally impeach Allende. Yet Unidad Popular's 
support unexpectedly increased from 36.2% in the presidential elections of September 1970 
to 43.4% in March 1973, a major blow to the Conservatives and a huge confidence boost to 
the Allende regime.297 
Even for Unidad Popular, the rise in support came as a surprise. The UP party saw the 
electoral victory as a clear indication that it was satisfying the demands of the working 
class. Yet the election results splintered the party as various factions formed based on 
different interpretations of the results. The more revolutionary members, approximately 
one third of the coalition, interpreted increased support as a desire to expedite the proposed 
socialist reforms. 298 Three days after the election, the far Left began calling for more 
radical reforms than those of Allende. The collapse of Unidad Popular left Allende trapped 
in political static, unable to advance any of his economic, political, or social reforms. As 
the economy further deteriorated, the country moved on the verge of civil war. On 
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September 11, 1973 the infamous day of the military coup and Allende's death, the final 
consequences of Allende's idealist political objectives and short-sighted planning 
materialized. 
Although the US government and US l'vtNCs contributed to the economic chaos that 
prevailed in 1972 as well as induced internal groups to react against the Allende regime, 
ultimately the internal politics of the Chilean state were the driving force that overthrew 
Allende.299 More relevantly, as obvious in the outline of events above, the copper MNCs 
played a very minimal role in affecting the final outcomes of the Allende regime. Without 
the presence of the MNCs, and now widely agreed upon, and also noteworthy is that 
without the presence of the US government, the Chilean coup would have occurred. 30o As 
previously noted, once nationalized the MNCs primary demand was for immediate and fair 
compensation and not the renunciation of nationalization. In other words, the l'vtNCs 
accepted nationalization. The economic disorder that ensued under Allende contradicted 
with the actual objectives of the MNCs who feared a weak economy would lower their 
chances at compensation. 
There are many ways to interpret the Allende regime. Some scholars attribute its failure to 
poor leadership while others laud the strong state rule and blame the political and economic 
crises on external forces. This study does not attempt to make an interpretation of 
Allende's regime; however, it does attempt to analyze the power dynamics between the 
Chilean state and the US multinationals over the control of Chile's primary industry. This 
interaction is the crux of the analysis and the focus of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: The Bare;aining Process 
The case study described above has been geared towards explaining how the Chilean state 
and the foreign MNCs defended their respective interests in the copper industry during 
1950 and 1973. The power dynamics between the two actors shed light onto greater 
theoretical implications underlying the bargaining process that took place. Understanding 
this bargaining process is essential to contextualizing the competing conceptual models that 
scholars commonly apply to the Chilean copper case. 
Understanding the power dynamics that unfolded in Chile between the state and the 
multinational giants requires a clarification of the instances in the bargaining process when 
the interests of each actor coincided and diverged. Tracing the political dynamics of the 
bargaining process will elucidate what ultimately favored the Chilean state over the 
multinational. However, beforehand, a theoretical assessment of the relationship between 
the host state and the foreign MNC, as well as the relative general bargaining positions 
between the actors must be outlined. 
There are some general deductions that can be made explicit about the actors involved in 
the case study: (i) each actor has individual and unique interests and powers; (ii) a state's 
ability to pursue its national interests is to a large extent dependent on its position in the 
international political economy; (iii) the copper MNCs are rational, profit-maximizing 
entities that engage in the political activities of the host country solely to enhance their 
economic welfare; (iv) the power of the copper MNCs is economic and determined by its 
large resource base and access to capital; (v) the Chilean state seeks sovereign control over 
its country and also the highest possible contribution of the country's resources to be 
dedicated to the wellbeing of its citizen; (vi) the bargaining position of one actor relies on 
the relative power of the other. 
Between 1950 and 1973, a wide range of policies were implemented toward the US 
multinationals in the copper industry, culminating with nationalization. The power 
dynamics involved bet\vcen the Chilean state and the US copper J\f'.JC provides valuable 
insight in understanding the state's drive for autonomy and the MNC's efforts to defend its 











explain the two theoretical frameworks that are most commonly discussed in the literature 
regarding the Chilean copper debate: dependencia theory and obsolescing theory. A review 
of the bargaining process that occurred between the state and the MNCs between 1950 and 
1973 will be useful in assessing the relevance of these two theories, and is the focus of this 
chapter. 
4.1 Copper Bargaining 
Understanding the bargaining process between the foreign multinationals and the Chilean 
state requires a review and an assessment of the interests and the relative power of each 
actor over the given time frame. The review of each episode will identify the interests and 
actions taken by each actor and examine the bargaining position of each actor relative to the 
other. 
This study identifies five critical episodes that occurred in the state-MNC bargaining 
process in Chile that elucidate the shift in power over time: (i) 1915, MNCs enter Chilean 
copper mines (ii) 1950, Videla abandons the Washington Consensus (iii) 1952, Ibanez's 
Nuevo Trato (iv) 1964, Frei's Chileanization and (v) 1970, Allende's nationalization. 
The scene for the first episode is the arrival of the MNCs to the Chile. At that point, the 
Chilean state's principal export, nitrates, had plummeted on the world market and an 
economic crisis was looming. The Chilean state lacked the capacity to develop the new 
industry which required massive industrial and capital investments, as well as the necessary 
technical expertise. The MNCs were financially capable of making such large investments 
and had the technical abilities to develop the industry. The host country, on the other hand, 
lacked the knowledge and financial capacity to develop the industry itself and therefore had 
little choice but to accept the investors on their terms.3Dl The interests of the US MNCs 
were to develop an industry that would earn sufficient revenues to rapidly compensate them 
for the large initial investments, make a high profitable return, as well as ensure the 
longevity of their investment through contracts with the Chilean state. The Chilean state 
was attracted to a potential boost in its economy and having a new primary export, as well 
the free development of an industry that it could not undertake independently. Therefore, 
the state welcomed the US MNCs using lucrative incentives, such as low tax rates and high 











remittance percentages. Because of the minimum regulation demanded by the Chilean state, 
the MNCs were able to remit massive profits, aided greatly by war-time production 
industries and US demand. The MNCs clearly had the higher bargaining hand. 
The second episode in the bargaining process, led by President Gonzalez, was intended to 
be a great leap forward for the state. Tax rates were increasing exponentially 
compromising a significant percentage of state revenues. Gonzalez's frustration against the 
MNCs was largely a consequence of the price ceiling implemented by the US government 
over Chilean copper to ensure a consistent supply of copper for strategic purposes, as well 
as the prohibition for Chilean copper to be sold to the USSR or any affiliate countries. 
Under the Washington Consensus, the US government granted 20% of sales control to the 
Chilean state as a compromise to their demands, which only enticed Chileans for greater 
control over the pricing scheme to accrue greater profits. Gonzalez exerted the state's 
sovereignty over the MNC investment to obtain 100% control over the sales. The MNCs 
hoped to maintain the bargaining leverage they possessed at the time of their initial 
investment, although it was rapidly declining. The US government, driven by its own 
strategic interests in the industry, provided support to protect MNC interests and enhance 
their bargaining position against the Chilean state. Nevertheless, the state was still able to 
exert power over the MNCs. Yet, Chile's adolescence in copper production, particularly on 
the international market, resulted in a drastic drop of Chile's share in the international 
copper market. Chile was left desperate for foreign intervention to re-stabilize its economy 
and regain its share of copper production in the international market. After having made 
significant progress, one callow move by the state allowed the MNC to regain significant 
bargaining leverage. 
The third bargaining episode was the consequence of Gonzalez's miscalculation, and 
resulted in a great leap backwards for the state in the bargaining process. Ibanez came to 
power and recognized the need for MNCs in the state's development goals. Trapped by 
grave economic circumstances, Ibanez conceded to the demands of the MNCs in the Nuevo 
Trato, who confidently advanced their goals on the bargaining agenda at the cost of the 
statc.\1NCs confident1y demanded minimum regulation from thc host statc, 10w tax rates, 
and high profit remittances. The interests of the MNCs remained consistent: defend the 











influence in the sovereign domain of the state had not waned and further escalated under 
Alessandri. To the state's favor, it succeeded in coaxing the MNCs to expand production, 
and progressively was able to increase tax regulations to gain a larger share of MNC profits. 
During this time period, popular anti-MNC sentiments became the center of the electoral 
debate, making copper ownership a highly politicized issue, and driving the country 
towards nationalization. The ideological influence of dependency theory greatly 
encumbered the MNC's bargaining position. 
The fourth bargaining episode, under Frei, represents the major thrust forward for the state 
in the bargaining process. Frei demanded and succeeded in attaining 51 % state ownership 
of the copper mines from the US copper giants. Kennecott prudently complied; 
recognizing that its bargaining position had deteriorated significantly yet saw a window of 
opportunity for possible compensation under Frei's joint venture program. Anaconda, on 
the contrary, initially refused to relinquish any of its assets but later acquiesced because of 
US pressure. Frei's program is an integral component to the full nationalization that took 
place once Allende came to power specifically because it allowed the state to acquire the 
skills needed to independently operate the mines as well as engage in the international 
market system. In his last state-of the-nation address, Frei stated that Chileanization 
conformed to Chile's needs by maintaining the benefits that MNCs bring to the host 
country, namely expertise and capital, which Chile did not possess independently.302 The 
program acquired funds from various financial institutions that allowed Chile to double its 
production and triple its refining.303 Chile was also able to develop the capacity to run the 
copper mines independently and take full control of the pricing scheme for the international 
market, while still benefiting from the market access and the technical know-how of the 
MNCs. It also downplayed the traumas that ensued from the process of nationalization, 
such as retaliation from US copper MNCS.304 Chileanization prudently avoided a number 
of consequences that complete nationalization created, namely, employment, the flow of 
technological expertise and innovations, import of spare parts and necessary machinery, 
and access to export markets. 305 As government or national investors become majority 
Frei in state-ofthe-nation address, Quinto mensaje del presidente de la repliblica. 
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owners, the joint venture appears to limit the risk of expropriation for the MNe. 306 
However, in the Chilean case, the joint venture program did precisely the reverse. 
What becomes obvious in this episode of the bargaining process is that the threat of 
nationalization alone, even without actual implementation, greatly elevated the position of 
the state over the NINe. As the government becomes the majority owner, for the MNC, the 
joint venture appears to limit the risk of expropriation. However, in the case of Chilean 
copper, the joint venture program did precisely the reverse.307 This is ironic because both 
actors benefited under Chileanization, primarily from expanded production and increased 
profits. Yet the state was still unsatisfied and pushed forward with full nationalization. 
The final bargaining episode was full nationalization under Salvador Allende. For the 
Chilean state, eventually the consequences of nationalization become more limited and the 
benefits become more tangible. Before moving towards full nationalization, the state 
needed to feel capable enough to assume the same role of the MNC. This was the most 
significant benefit of Chileanization the program enabled the state to feel capable enough 
to undertake full responsibilities of the copper production and sales. This was the primary 
reason why Allende was able to nationalize its industry. 
By the time Allende ascended to power, the country was moving full speed towards full 
state-ownership. This was most obvious in the 1970 presidential campaign in which each 
candidate along the political spectrum called for nationalization. This was in part because 
of the political fervor sweeping through Latin America, as well as the Cold War ideology 
that called for Marxist reforms, specifically a stronger role of the state in the domestic 
economy. Yet, for the developing state, the added state revenues that come with full 
ownership make nationalization particularly enticing. The populace believes that its 
welfare will improve with added state revenues and therefore places demands on the 
government. While these political influences may have been driving agents in the process 
of nationalization, Chile was completely ready to assume full ownership over its copper 
industry. Thus, it can be concluded that the nationalization process itself was a rational 
state action and an economically sound policy. Tt can also be deduced that Allende's 












copper policies were simply a part of that process and not some arbitrary radical exertion of 
state power solely impelled by a Marxist ideology and nationalism. 
Many political and economic scholars have evaluated the benefits and consequences of 
Allende's copper nationalization program. As addressed previously, Allende's 
nationalization program bore significant consequences for Chile's copper industry that 
debilitated the overall economic welfare of the country. Arguably the most detrimental 
factor was the fall in the price of copper. Copper is referred to as an 'unstable export' 
because of its volatility on the international market price. 308 When the welfare of an 
economy is dependent on a single export commodity, the country is left vulnerable to the 
international market. Many scholars blame Allende's economic crisis on the international 
copper market rather than the actual efficiency of the Allende government in copper 
production.309 This is supported by the fact that copper output increased 6 percent during 
Allende's first year, reaching 572,000 tons in 1971. 310 Both Kennecott and the US 
government influenced the sales and the price of the mineral internationally, but it was the 
fluctuation of the mineral in the international copper price, an external factor that Chile 
could not control, that proved the most detrimental. The Allende government not only 
failed to prepare for the loss of state revenues but simultaneously undertook very costly 
reform measures that were economically unsustainable, particularly without foreign 
reserves. Indeed, Allende's confrontational approach towards the MNCs also generated 
harmful consequences. Specifically his no compensation with no contestation position 
provoked the loss of financial capital, technology and market access. 311 Allende's 
unwillingness to negotiate terms of compensation scared private investors from entering 
and caused both foreign and local investors to leave to flee, exacerbating Chile's debt.312 
Additionally, when a country undergoes nationalization, private as well as international 
institutions are less inclined to lend capital in the form of investment, loans, or credit,313 
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4.2 The Determining Factor 
The political turmoil that ensued after nationalization raised the question of interference on 
the part of the US government and the US MNCs in defense of their investments and 
interests in the industry. As determined through the case study, the involvement of both US 
actors was relatively minimal, and the internal political dynamic within the country was the 
primary reason behind the overthrow of Allende. But a critical question remains: What 
limited the US MNCs from successfully defending their investments? 
The greatest limitation of the NINCs' bargaining power was the nature of the copper 
industry itself, which has been a recurring theme throughout this study. Historically, the 
state's leverage is at an advantage when dealing with a mineral based industry.314 In the 
natural resource sector, MNCs have consistently fared poorly in defending their interests 
when bargaining with the host state. The sector falls in the area most prone to 
expropriation. 315 In most industries, the state cannot prevent the exit of the MNC. 
However, this is the distinction that impairs the MNC in the natural resource sector -- while 
the MNC can leave, its physical investments cannot. As raw material investments are 
immobile, if the physical investment is left behind, it becomes the property of the state. 
This not only enhances the bargaining position of the state, it entices the state to assume 
full control over the industry. 
Copper is considered an "exposed enclave" which places it at the heart of economic 
nationalism. 316 This is primarily a cause of Chile's unreserved reliance on the mineral. 
MNC presence becomes especially controversial when it is concentrated in one industry 
that is the primary source of revenue from exports. 317 The copper industry was also 
considered a foreign enclave. Dependistas criticized the MNCs for isolating the industry 
from the country, arguing that any foreign investment or technological advancement in 
Latin America went directly to these industries without permeating to the popUlation or 
other sectors.318 Moreover, because the NINCs used a vertically oriented corporate strategy 
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geared towards extraction in Chile and excluded the other steps of the production process, 
the industry was further isolated from the host country.319 Copper is also considered an 
unstable export because of its volatile price fluctuations on the world market. As the major 
source of foreign exchange, the mineral has a crucial impact on the balance of payments. 
F or these reasons, dependency theorists believe that nationalization of the copper industry 
is the only way to assure that the country could reap the full benefits of this vital industry. 
The reasons why the copper industry was so enticing for the Chilean state to nationalize are 
precisely why historically raw material industries are the most popularly nationalized sector. 
Thus, the final determinant for the state to take full control of its industry is therefore 
dependent on the state's confidence and ability to provide for the capital, technical 
expertise, and market access. 320 Additionally, in the natural resource sector, technical 
expertise and market knowledge are much easier to access than other sectors.321 All of 
these factors impair the bargaining position of the MNC in this sector. 
Not surprisingly, other industries with huge fixed, or "sunk", investments follow a similar 
fate. There are two other industries that are historically more readily nationalized: public 
utilities and transportation.322 Like mineral resources, these industries share similar traits 
that make attractive industries for the state to control, most notably that they require 
massive initial investments that cannot be removed easily. In 1962, after the Brazilian 
telephone and electrical MNCs were nationalized, President Kennedy noted that US 
investments in such "politically exposed natural monopolies" are likely to be criticized as 
exploitative.323 On the contrary, in areas of manufacturing and processing, there are fewer 
government takeovers. 
Possession of valuable resources undermines the structure of power of each actor.324 For 
the copper MNCs, their resources came in the form of capital, both financially and 
technically. Yet both of these types of resources are relatively 'fixed'. Constructing a 
copper mine requires massive financial and technical investment. These investments are 
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considered 'sunk' costs. On the technical end, the copper industry utilizes relatively stable 
technology and is not a highly innovative.325 For decades, the technological factors and 
knowledge related to copper refining had been readily available and new innovation is not a 
defining aspect of the industry.326 Therefore, once the MNCs had created the industry and 
shown the state how to use the technology, the state can feasibly replicate the technological 
process. Furthermore, Chilean copper was mostly sold for global markets in its raw form 
as it is a mineral used in the manufacturing of a myriad of goods that are produced outside 
of Chile. This again worked favorably for state ownership because the state could sustain 
production levels without relying on the MNCs for research and development bases or 
having to create their own once the industry was nationalized. Therefore, for the state, 
learning the tricks of the trade was relatively feasible. 
Douglas Bennett and Kenneth Sharpe argue that a particular resource in a particular conf1ict 
shapes the nature of the conflict and the identities of the actors. 327 This can be observed in 
the bargaining process, most explicitly through the tacit agreements that were made by both 
actors in its duration. In the process, there are always tacit agreements involved.328 This 
infers that both parties acknowledge their relative positions of power related to the other. 
The weaker actor may choose not to articulate its interests when it knows that its bargaining 
leverage is limited relative to the other party. Therefore, actors will only come to the 
bargaining table with issues that they believe can generate some level of success. 329 
The power of the state can be exemplified through the implicit understanding that took 
place in the bargaining process. Several tacit agreements were involved in the Chilean 
copper case. For example, under Ibanez's Nuevo Treaty, the MNCs entered negotiations 
fully aware that the state needed them for political and economic purposes. The state was 
forced to consent to several MNC demands that it otherwise would have refused. While 
both parties were concerned about profit maximization, the state's primary objective was 
profit redistribution, while the MNCs' concern was profit repatriation. The MNCs pushed 
and easily received extremely favorable profit maximizing regulations. Nearly two decades 
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later, the power positions had completely reversed. By the time Anaconda entered 
negotiations with Frei, its position was extremely weak relative to the state. Anaconda 
reluctantly had to accept the terms defined by the state for fear of completely losing its 
investments. Moreover, under Allende, the MNCs had lost all power, and the President, 
completely aware of the state's relative position, constitutionally prohibited further 
negotiations with the MNCs over the matter. By the time full nationalization was 
underway, defending any ownership over the mines had been completely excluded as a 
possible option. The MNCs consciously accepted this deterioration of their bargaining 
power and pushed for compensation instead. 
The obsolescing bargain, therefore, accurately describes the process that began decades 
prior to the actual nationalization of the copper mines in 1973. The shift in power from the 
MNC to the state is clearly identifiable. The MNC initially holds the power to choose into 
which country it will invest, and undoubtedly seeks out favorable investment climates. 
Therefore, a host state who is fully aware that only with the assistance of the MNC will it 
be able to develop an industry, must present an investment friendly climate. The host 
government seeks to preside over the direction of flow of foreign investment for its country 
and therefore begins to exercise certain policies that support its own development agenda. 
Indeed, of the various devices employed by the state - ranging from taxation and fiscal 
instruments, to a mixed economy or a joint venture program, to nationalization -
nationalization is the most radical and assertive action the Chilean state took to assert its 
power against the M1'JC. As made obvious throughout the process of nationalization, the 
government consistently tried to raise the bar to hold the MNC more accountable to the 
state and persistently sought to make the MNC serve its interests through various 
negotiations, such paying higher taxes, expanding production, or investing more capital. 
Indeed, the only solution available to the "obsolescence of the bargain" was 
nationalization.33o 
Reviewing the dynamics involved the Chilean copper case allows certain conclusions to be 
drawn. Initially, the Chilean state was faced with its own inability to develop its most 
critical industry that could produce the economic resources to meet and sllstain the welfare 











needs of its population. This left it dependent on and vulnerable to larger economic actors, 
namely the ~Cs, for decades. The state was limited by a number of factors, such as the 
lack of expertise in the global market, knowledge about the industry, lack of capital, its 
reliance on primarily one export for income, and lack of technical expertise, to name a few. 
At that point, the Great Depression had nearly devastated Chile's economy. This clearly 
elevated the bargaining position of the MNC, as the state was desperate for industrial 
development and economic assistance. According to the obsolescing bargain theory, the 
MNC's strength is the greatest at the moment of new investment. 331 Indeed, during the 
Great Depression, the MNC increased their investment and expanded copper production, 
thus saving the Chilean economy. Yet, after that point, the relative bargaining power of the 
MNC began to fade as the state observed that the investments were committed and difficult 
to remove.332 When Gonzalez prematurely tried to expropriate the MNCs in 1950, the state 
suffered from its inexperience, consequently boosting the position of the MNCs over the 
state. Gonzalez's naivety impaired the bargaining position of the state and consequently 
the state was forced to concede some of its bargaining power to persuade the MNCs. Yet 
the domestic tension over such strong foreign influence began to build again as profits 
increased and continued to leave the country. Taxes and exchange rate policies were 
enforced again in order to capture a larger percentage of the profits. Yet, the populace still 
disapproved. The thrust towards nationalization was harnessed under Chileanization, 
allowing the state to develop the skills and technical capacity that would fulfill the same 
role of the MNCs in the industry. At this point, Chile reversed the bargaining process to 
work in its favor. For the first time, it was able to satisfy its population independent of the 
MNC. 
By assuming full control, the state turned the obsolescent bargain to work in its favor and 
allowed the host government to revise the industry's development as it chose, in this case, 
with the exclusion of the MNC.333 
The Chilean case, however, is an unusually intriguing theoretical case study because of the 
possibility that it does not coincide with the obsolescing bargain theory, despite the 
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bargaining process that unequivocally occurred. This is precisely why many scholars 
associate the dependency theory with the Chilean copper case. If the Chilean case strictly 
corresponded with the obsolescing theory, theoretically the very nature of the copper 
industry would have determined the position of the MNCs from the onset. The 
presumption, therefore, is that the US copper MNCs were destined to be nationalized and 
should have expected to hand over their assets to the state. However, the influence of the 
US government in this case study adds a peculiar twist in the final assessment to whether 
the dependency theory is in fact the more suitable theoretical framework. 
4.3 US Interests and the Cold War 
It is often argued that US objectives in the international political economy after the Second 
World War centered specifically around business interests-to create a capitalist world 
system that would allow US businesses to operate and profit everywhere in the world.334 
MNCs required a world composed of stable capitalist countries that would grant free access 
to strategic natural resources. 335 For MNCs to thrive, it was necessary to limit the 
developing world's development and independence to prevent an ideological conflict with 
American capitalism.336 Therefore, when conflicts occur, US corporations can turn to their 
home governments for protection and defense, and the US government will intervene to 
defend its interests in the host country. Indeed, the US government has repeatedly 
intervened to protect US private interests through military, economic and political action.337 
If it is true that the US government is concerned only with business interests, then the 
logical conclusion is that the state will come to the defense of the MNCs. 
In his assessment of the US government and US multinationals, Stephen Krasner takes an 
opposing view to explain the rationale behind official US involvement. He argues that the 
US government has repeatedly resisted corporate pressure and concludes that the US 
government is only willing to use overt or covert action when there are greater political 
goals involved.338 In particular, during the era following World War II, US foreign policy 
was specifically designed to prevent the spread of communism and advance its own 
334 Joyce Kolka and Gabriel Kolka. The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-
1954. Ct\ew York: Hilrper and Row Puhlishers, 1972),2. 
335 Ibid. 
336 Ibid. 
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ideologies in host countries. 339 He argues that regarding private interests, the US 
government exercised extreme caution in confronting issues that were solely economic. In 
these matters, the US government was only willing to apply diplomatic or economic tactics, 
even when its supply of the material was threatened.34o 
The Chilean case study supports Krasner's analysis. \Vhen examining US official action in 
Chile, the US government had the military and economic resources needed to buttress the 
position of the copper MNCs that could have potentially reversed the bargaining outcomes. 
Yet, it did not do so. On the contrary, it encouraged the US MNCs to deliberately concede 
their bargaining leverage in order to support its own objectives. Both the US Ambassador's 
intervention in Anaconda's negotiations with Frei and the US government's overall support 
for Chileanization indicate that the MNCs were coerced to relinquish their holdings. 341 
Krasner calls this "active accommodation" as the MNCs were obliged to accommodate to 
US government objectives. 
It cannot be denied that the US had several strategic interests in Chile interests that 
reinforced its hegemonic position. The US MNCs consistently maintained a far lower sales 
price for the US government for a mineral that was critical to the country's industrialization 
and its military strength. The firms also ensured that none of Chile's copper was sold to the 
Soviet Bloc, thereby attempting to limit the Soviets from advancing in its industrialization 
and military build-up. In this sense, the MNCs reinforced US policy. However, as this 
paper has shown, the primary objective of the US government was to prevent Allende's 
ascension to power. For this reason, the US government tried to bolster Frei's popularity 
by supporting Chilean ownership of the copper industry despite its contradiction with the 
MNCs' objectives. 
This is not to suggest that protecting private investment was not a priority of the US 
government, but rather the US government perceived other interests to be of higher 
importance. Recall that Kennedy'S Alliance for Progress was fabricated by the US 
government with the cooperation and financial support of US multinationals for dual 
339 Ibid., 13 7. 
340 Ibid., 151. 











reasons: to protect private interests and prevent the spread of communism. Susan Strange 
touches on this "euphemistic" notion of foreign aid arguing that it is impossible to divorce 
the 'economic' kind of welfare from the 'political' kind of welfare and that such altruistic 
motives usually seek a political and/or economic exchange that will support, reinforce, and 
help to sustain the position of the authority.342 The Alliance created an allusion that the 
two actors were partners in the project. Paul Sigmund correctly notes that this government-
business alliance posed the likely possibility of conflict right from the start, as maintaining 
a sound arena of investment and satisfying the economic and social needs in Latin America 
may counter the interests of private foreign investors. 343 This conflict became more 
obvious as the Cold War pushed forward and Allende's popUlarity intensified. As the 
threat of Allende materialized, defending the interests of the MNCs became less and less of 
a priority for the US government. 
This aligns well with Robert Gilpin's analysis of the US multinational corporation. Robert 
Gilpin contends that the success of the US MNC is directly contingent on its reliance on the 
recognized strength and power of the US. 344 He argues that the US, because of its 
dominant economic and political strength as well as its superior position in the world 
system, has been able to manipUlate economic and technological forces to serve its own 
interests. The US has created the 'necessary political framework' for MNCs to succeed and 
it is under this system that US multinationals have thrived. 345 Gilpin claims that US 
corporations have buttressed dominant US ideology throughout the world. 346 The US 
government uses the MNC to pursue its own political agenda, yet when the interests of the 
US government and the MNCs diverge, the US government will pursue its own interests 
even if it impairs the position of the MNC. Looking back at the intervention of the US 
Ambassador in the Anaconda-Frei settlement, despite Anaconda's reluctance to nationalize 
the US government asserted great pressure to make the MNC comply for its own self-
342 Susan Strange. States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy (New York: Basil 
Blackwell Inc, 1988), 207 -209. 
343 Sigmund, lVIII/tinalionals in l~atin Ameriro, 132. 
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interests.347 Ambassador Korry's persistence was largely prompted by pressures from the 
OPIC insurance because ofthe potential losses to the OPIC reserves.348 
In conclusion, it is expected that the NINCs will attempt to counter the state's efforts for 
national control. However, as demonstrated through the Chilean case, predicting the US 
government's willingness to come to their aid is not as obvious. Although the Chilean case 
proved the contrary, it may be presumed that when the interests of the US government and 
the US MNCs are aligned, ideologically, culturally, militarily, politically, economically, or 
a combination of all, the government may come to the defense of the MNC, as has occurred 
in several instances throughout history.349 If the US government had come to the defense 
of the US copper MNCs in Chile, potentially the fate of the MNCs would have been 
reversed, and different theoretical deductions concluded. For this reason, it is essential to 
remember that a case study cannot prove or refute a theory. However, the Chilean copper 
case does help advance the theoretical debate concerning two relevant theories. Given that 
the copper MNCs played a relatively insignificant role in the 1973 political outcomes, the 
last section of this paper is dedicated to examining the applicability of the dependency 
model. 
4.4. Breaking Free from Dependencia 
For the purposes of this paper, dependency theory should be understood as an abstraction to 
explain underdevelopment for the third world. The theory argues that dependency is a 
condition that allows core countries to determine the boundaries for the development of 
periphery countries via the structure of the international system. In the post-War era, the 
idea of dependency was largely forged by the interaction of the MNC with the developing 
world.350 The MNC became a way to reinforce the structures of the international political 
economy that limit the development of the periphery. In other words, the independent 
variable is the multinational corporation and the dependent variable is dependency. Thus, 
the MNC produces dependency. 
347 Atll!tinotiona!s in Latin America, 305. 
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From the general understanding of dependency theory provided in this paper, a number of 
implicit inferences can be examined in relation to dependency theory and the Chilean case 
study. The following inferences from dependency theory can be identified as particularly 
relevant to the Chilean case: (i) the structure of the capitalist international system, namely 
the division of the core and the periphery, impairs the development of the periphery country 
(ii) As profit-maximizing entities, :MNCs will defend their interests to avoid financial losses. 
Such tactics include directly exercising power over the host government, indirectly 
exercising power via its home government, or using the international system. Because of its 
elevated status in the global system over the periphery country, either independently or 
because of the position of its home state in the international system, dependency theory 
asserts the :MNC will succeed (iii) the multinational corporation perpetuates under-
development in the periphery country. These three inferences will be used to measure the 
relevance of the dependency theory to the Chilean case. 
There were instances in the Chilean case where certain structural constraints related to the 
international political economy limited Chile's bargaining leverage. Arguably the greatest 
influence of the global system on Chile's political outcomes was the international copper 
market pricing scheme. While actual copper production remained efficient under Allende, 
the drastic fall in the price of the mineral on the world market proved disastrous. Many 
scholars attribute this drop in price as the pivotal reason for Allende's economic 
tribulations. The fall in the copper price was a fatality beyond the control of Allende. It 
does, however, imply that Chile's level of development and position in the international 
system contributed to its inability to counter the shock. In general, countries with small and 
inflexible internal structures are highly vulnerable to shocks and fluctuations in the 
international system. 351 This can create severe economic and political dislocation for the 
country, and proves particularly painful for political leaders who become the targets for the 
economic crisis.352 This was particularly detrimental for Chile, whose economy was based 
on one primary export commodity and not diversified in other exports or means of 
production. Consequently, Allende suffered politically. The conclusion, therefore, can be 
made that Chile's internal economic structures were not developed enough to withstand the 












unpredicted volatility of the global economy.353 Susan Strange lends the following support: 
"Where states were once the masters of markets, now it is the markets which, on many 
crucial issues, are the masters over the governments of states.,,354 Strange's argument 
insinuates that the fall of the copper price was not only independent of the Chilean state, 
but also of the US \1NCs and the US government. However, what the Chilean state could 
control, namely copper production, remained efficient throughout Allende's term.355 Thus, 
the global system limited Chile's development path insofar as it was not able to withstand 
the price shocks. Yet this was independent of US action. 
Moving onto the second implication, the case study shows that the MNCs proved 
ineffective in defending their interests against the state. Stephen Krasner argues that the 
greatest weapon that the MNC had over the Chilean state is its influence in and access to 
world markets. 356 Using world markets, the MNC is able to alter global sales that are 
necessary for the economic and political welfare of the host country. 357 As demonstrated 
in the Chilean case, Kennecott was able to gamer international support by utilizing its 
customer base and creditors in Japan and Western Europe to pressure their governments to 
place demands on the Chilean government. The 1-fNC did show that the structure of the 
global system can also open up opportunities for the l\!INC to defend its interests 
independently_ Kennecott tried to bolster its bargaining position through transnational 
alliances, before and after nationalization. Kennecott's efforts hindered Chile's 
development efforts by impairing the state's capacity to build its own international 
alliances.358 Yet, the extent of that influence, although it lowered sales and temporarily 
stifled various alliances, was relatively minor in comparison to the rest of the economic 
problems that plagued Allende's term, mostly a cause of his poor economic planning and 
flawed policy making. Recall that Kennecott did not intend to overturn Allende's regime 
through an economic blockade, but rather attempted to pressure the host government for 
fair compensation and its actions. Although effective in attaining compensation, and 
therefore successful in defending its interests, Kennecott's actions cannot be interpreted as 
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pivotal in overturning the Allende government. Even less significant, Anaconda was 
virtually powerless in defending its interests and exercised no influence in the political 
circumstances surrounding Allende's downfall. On the contrary, the state was very 
assertive in it policies towards the MNCs, with the only regression in the bargaining 
process occurring between 1952 and 1955. This was most blatantly expressed through the 
constitutional amendment that made nationalization the legal action of the state to exercise 
its 'sovereign and inalienable right'. Under this amendment, Allende further enforced the 
finality of the state's decision by precluding the MNCs from contesting its decision. This 
essentially prevented the MNCs from exerting any power over the host state directly. The 
third approach taken by the Ml'JCs to protect their investments was seeking support from 
their home government. The evidence provided in this study has affirmed that the US 
government not only failed to support of the MNCs, but moreover impaired their 
bargaining power. In this respect, dependency theory is clearly not applicable to this case 
study. 
Multinationals are disparaged by dependency theorists for being products of global 
capitalism that exploit the developing state and perpetuate under-development. The most 
obvious manner through which MNCs do this, and arguably the most disconcerting for the 
developing country, is its pattern of distribution, specifically the movement of capital from 
the developing state to the developed state. Losses of high profits from the national 
economy to the foreigner are interpreted as imperialism and exploitation?59 For those who 
align with this point of view, such as James Petras, the copper industry was a source of 
Chilean dependency and underdevelopment largely because of the profits remitted 
abroad. 360 This is a primary reason multinationals are heavily criticized for further 
embedding dependency relationships and impeding the direction of development.36I 
It cannot be contested that the MNCs fully reaped the benefits of the Chilean copper 
industry while they could. Between 1945 and 1972, American MNCs made profits totaling 
$7.2 billion and reinvested only $1 billion of that in Chile.362 Yet the contributions of the 
foreign copper giants to the Chilean state cannot go unrecognized. Through the initial 
:,,,y Sigmund, A111ltinationals in Latin America, 276. 
360 Petras, 26. 
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investments of the MNCs, their technological expertise, and their access to international 
markets, Chile's copper industry, the foundation of its economy, developed. Thus, the 
l'v1NCs were more of a constructive force and than a destructive one as the dependency 
theory suggests. In the final analysis, it is obvious that both actors profited from their 
interaction, and ultimately the state reaped the greater of the benefits, particularly in the 
long run. 
Upon analyzing the abstraction of dependency theory as presented in this study in the 
Chilean copper case, the analytical findings largely tend to contradict the dependency 
theory. The larger international system and the position of Chile as a developing country 
did influence the political outcomes of the country, yet this occurred irrespective of any 
actions taken by the l'v1NCs and the state. Namely the fall in the price of copper was subject 
to fluctuations of the international system itself, and Chile suffered because of its lower 
level of development. The Chilean case demonstrates that while certain structures may 
exist, they do not necessarily determine outcomes. Recall that by 1973, the Chilean state 
had begun to overcome the economic difficulties that the international system initially 
created. 
The most obvious flaw with the dependency theory in the Chilean case, however, is the 
interpretation of the capacities of the state and the l'v1NC. Neither the copper MNCs nor the 
Chilean state fit the molds that the theory suggests. The claim that the multinational is 
exploitative and a cause of under-development is disproved in the Chilean case as the 
l'v1NCs actually paved the way for Chile's development. Despite what the theory purports, 
the MNCs did not possess the power to alter the political outcomes of the country. 
Likewise, it would be a false presumption to interpret the state as a passive or debilitated 
actor against the multinational. This is a common critique of dependency studies.363 In fact, 
as the Chilean state demonstrated through its successful takeover of its copper industry 
from foreign control, the state has the power to not only counter the multinational but to 
overthrow it. 











This paper has not set out to determine whether the global economy is in fact a structure 
supported by dependency relationships, nor does it attempt to confirm the various 
intricacies of the theory, such as the notion of a core and periphery. This study does seek to 
find the relevance and applicability of dependencia as it remains the convenient theory to 
describe the Chilean case. In this respect, the theory remains tenuously applicable to the 
Chilean case. 
While there may be little relevance of the dependency theory as a conceptual framework to 
describe the Chilean copper case, this study does acknowledge the significance of the 
dependency theory as a powerful force that impelled the Chilean state to nationalize its 
industry. The sentiments of dependency embodied fears that foreign strength would 
overpower the Chilean state and resentment that the MNC captured rents that would 
otherwise improve state welfare. 364 Robert Gilpin correctly notes that the expansion of 
national economic capabilities spur national desires for economic self-determination, which 
naturally will challenge the hegemony that the MNC once enjoyed.365 
For Theodore Moran, Chile's copper nationalization process serves as an insightful case 
study about a periphery country that successfully reclaimed its sovereignty and the right to 
control its own economic life in the face of great opposition. His argument follows that 
confrontations between the host government and the foreign multinationals creates a natural 
bargaining process, driven by the desire to break free from the relationship of 
dependency.366 For Moran, the ideological force of dependency within the country was the 
most significant and powerful force of the nationalization process. 
This study agrees with Moran and also recogmzes the importance of the geo-political 
climate of the time. James Petras contends that both of these external factors facilitated the 
political change in Chile, specifically the position of the US as the regional hegemon and 
the growing political fervor in Latin America, namely regional nationalism. 367 Indeed, the 
two forces reinforced each other. For the Chileans, US MNCs represented US hegemony 
within their borders. As US multinationals accumulated and remitted larger profits that 
Moran, A4u/linationa! Corporations and the Politics of Dependence, 19. 
365 Robert Gilpin cited in Sigmund, Multinationals in Latin America, 305. 
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could otherwise Improve the state's welfare, sentiments of dependency 
reawakened .. dormant national sentiments". 368 Both Allende and F rei rose to power on 
platforms that called for revolutionary change in the "distribution of power".369 This was 
directly related to an end of US imperialism. As the US copper multinationals were the 
most visible symbols of US domination in the country, full ownership of the copper mines 
became the target for reform measures. Frei's Chileanization greatly empowered the 
technical capacity of the state against US influences yet left the populace psychologically 
wanting more. This psychological satisfaction was found in Marxism, the antithesis of US 
ideology, and in Allende, the strongest opponent of US influence. 
Because greater state involvement in the economy directly challenged the capitalist 
ideology of the US government, and because state takeovers are at the core of the Marxist 
doctrine, it makes sense that Allende's first order of business upon entering office was full 
nationalization of the country's most important industry. Yet despite Allende's 
condemnation against the US MNCs and his commitment to Marxism, copper 
nationalization was not solely a consequence of political fervor. The obsolescing 
bargaining process that began decades prior to nationalization had prepared the way for the 
state to assume full control. Nationalization merely represented the final episode of that 
bargaining process. And Allende, although politically controversial and not exceptionally 
tactful in his implementation, was simply a part of that process. Essentially, he completed 
the final step of a bargaining process that had been in motion for decades. The obsolescing 
theory recognizes Chile's nationalization as the final sequence of a natural, incremental 
process. Moran actually refers to Chile's process as "painfully slow".37o 
Therefore it can be concluded that both the ideological struggle against dependency and the 
Cold War environment that surrounded copper nationalization were critical driving agents 
in the obsolescing bargaining process that culminated with nationalization. Dependency 
theory provoked Chile to assert its power over the MNC and break free from the condition. 
Ironically, dependency theory inspired the state to overtake the MNC and has therefore 
disproved the relevance of dependency theory for this paper. Moran contends that it was 
368 Ibid. 
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this idea of dependency that motivated Chile to acquire the necessary skills that would 
make them independent of the MNCS.371 In other words, dependency theory mentally and 
physically empowered the state in the obsolescing bargain. Therefore, although not an 
applicable theoretical framework for Chile, dependency theory was pivotal to the struggle; 
in such a way that it ironically inspired Chile to not fall victim to the very limitations that 
the theory espouses. 











Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Many renowned scholars of political economy share parallel perspectives to dependency 
theory asserting that the MNC is a powerful force in the international system that has not 
only challenged, but redefined the capacity of the state. Robert Gilpin asserts that MNCs 
represent the ideal of the liberal economy, where nation-states become insignificant players 
and national borders lack the capacity to control such powerful forces. 372 Susan Strange 
contends that multinationals are "more powerful than the states to whom ultimate authority 
over society and economy belong.,,373 Such assertions imply that one would expect a small 
country like Chile to be unable to defend its interests against the multinational corporation. 
This brings to light the larger theme of this study and asks the following question: Which is 
more powerful, the multinational corporation or the sovereign nation-state? The 
conclusions from the Chilean case offer some insight. 
This paper has juxtaposed two opposing theories in order to better understand the power 
relationship between the Chilean state and the MNCs that has been so controversial in 
Chile's history. The two theories, obsolescing bargaining and dependency, provide 
opposing hypotheses to the outcomes of the 1973 crisis. Given the intensity of the Cold 
War environment, the US government's fears over Marxist revolutions particularly in Latin 
America, the huge investments of US multinationals in the country, and Allende's dramatic 
death, Chile's history has been subject to mUltiple interpretations. Yet, the empirical 
evidence provided in this paper clearly disproves the relevance of dependency theory as an 
appropriate framework to describe the Chilean case. The evidence confirms that the US 
copper MNCs were defenseless against the Chilean state and played a relatively 
insignificant role in the political outcomes of 1973. 
In contrast, the obsolescing bargaining theory purports the state as a competent and capable 
actor that can counter the multinational corporation. The case study has clearly shown that 
the bargaining process between the state and the MNCs shifted over time in favor of the 
state. This was because of the massive "sunk" investments required for natural resource 
372 Gilpin, US Power and the Multinational Corporation, 288. 
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industries. Ironically, the high fixed costs that initially gave the ~'l"C such immense 
bargaining leverage thereafter became its greatest liability. In that process, Frei's 
Chileanization should be largely accredited for Chile's economic independence. By 
enabling the state to assume the responsibilities of the MNCs, Chileanization essentially 
reversed the power dynamics of the bargaining process and allowed Chile to break free 
from its dependence on the external forces. 
Yet nationalization was greatly aided by the nationalist sentiments of dependency theory 
that accompanied the obsolescing bargaining process leading up to nationalization. The 
political fervor around dependency theory inspired the state to construct the path towards 
nationalization. Indeed, the country's fixation on the condition of dependency allowed it to 
practically break free from it. The paradigm, therefore, did play a pivotal role in the 
struggle against dependency, but ironically as a means of achieving independence. 
The geo~political context in which this case study takes place is of critical importance to the 
bargaining process that took place. Upon entering office, Allende denounced capitalism 
and all US interference in the country, and exerted this through nationalization of the 
copper industry. Naturally, the US MNCs created defense strategies using three primary 
approaches: direct exercise of power in the host government, appealing for support from the 
US government, and using their positions and contacts in the international system. Only 
the last approach in the international system proved remotely successful, and even that 
merely resulted in fair compensation for one MNC. In the host state, Allende exerted 
sovereign state rule by making nationalization a constitutional amendment in order to 
prevent the US MNCs from defending their interests within the country. Approaching the 
home government for support actually further impaired the :rvtJ~Cs' bargaining leverage. 
In this respect, the study has indirectly supported Robert Gilpin's framework, which, 
although not a central theme, merits recognition. Recall Gilpin's assertion that the US 
government needs the MNC for strategic reasons and thereby supports the MNC in its 
profit-maximizing endeavors throughout the world. Yet in the Chilean copper case, the US 
government's concern with the Cold War prevented it from not only protecting the 
of the MNCs, but actually motivated the US government to undermine the MNCs' 











of the NlNC do not support the designated priorities of the US government, the US 
government will not come to the defense of the M~C. 
A clear way to affirm the relative power of the primary actors is to measure each one's 
success in realizing its specified goals regarding Chile and the copper industry. The MNCs 
were concerned with maximizing profit and protecting their long term physical investments. 
As the bargaining process proceeded, the NlNCs struggled to retain high profit margins and 
protecting their long term physical investments became more problematic with time. For 
that reason, once nationalized, MNC efforts were solely focused on fair compensation. The 
US government had strategic interests in Chile, primarily to prevent the spread of 
communism, but also to maintain a consistent copper supply and promote US private 
interests. Allende's rise to power obviously diverged from the primary objectives of the 
US government and the US MNCs. Therefore, the goals of the US government were 
moderately achieved. While it appears that the interests of the US government and the US 
MNCs were aligned to prevent Allende's rise to power, the outcomes of his death three 
years later produced different results for the two actors. For the US government, Allende's 
death satisfied the government's primary objective as it prevented a communist revolution 
from fully materializing in Chile. For the US MNCs, on the other hand, the Allende's 
death did not produce an undoing of nationalization; the copper industry was the only major 
industry left nationalized under the new government.374 This confirms that the MNCs were 
virtually powerless against the state. Furthermore, because Allende was killed by his own 
people, the insignificance of the MNCs is reinforced given that the industry had already 
been nationalized. 
The Chilean state proved the only actor capable of fully attaining its specified objectives, 
namely full control over its copper industry, sole recipient of the industry's rents, economic 
sovereignty, and the nationalist satisfaction derived from expelling all US influence in the 
country. Chile essentially sought after a redistribution of power and wealth. Its ability to 
achieve that demonstrates the limited influence the MNCs and the US government actually 
had over Chile's domain. 
374 Note: The MNCs were granted some compensation under the military dictatorship, yet far below what the 











The role of the US government is critical for the theoretical analysis of this study. Equally 
important to consider is the alternative position the US government could have taken. If the 
US government had opted to protect the copper MNCs, potentially the outcomes could have 
overturned and favored the MNCs over the state. Under this premise, dependency theory 
may be an applicable framework. Yet, this is all conjecture. Wnat can be confirmed is that 
the dependency theory is not a relevant framework for the Chilean copper case. 
Despite the dependency argument that the MNC is the source of under-development for the 
third world, the M)JCs spurred economic growth for Chile by developing its copper 
industry. The M)JCs also proved incapable of defending its interests against the state 
despite its large economic resource base, its position in the international economy, and the 
relative power of its home government. This study has not sought to form any conclusions 
about the relevance or usefulness of dependency theory as there may exist any number of 
cases where the theory is apt. Yet from the Chilean case, it can be concluded that 
dependency theory ignores the benefits that MNCs can offer the third world. It can also be 
concluded that the theory ignores the independent power that small actors, like Chile, can 
possess. 
The dramatic events of 1973 in Chile have kept scholars intrigued for decades. Meddled in 
the mystery and confusion that surrounds Allende's death, the multinational corporation has 
been viewed by the world with a suspicious eye. The evidence in this paper reveals that 
such suspicions are misconceived. Chile's remarkable struggle to break free from 
dependencia shows that the state can defend itself from powerful external forces, namely 
the multinational corporation. Furthermore, the Chilean copper case demonstrates that 
rigid conceptual frameworks, such as the dependency theory, conceal the many 
complexities surrounding the interaction of the developing state and the MNc.375 For this 
reason, the debate between the two actors remains a highly contentious and imperative 
topic in the discipline of international relations. 
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Appendix lA (Data & Graph) 
U.S. Imports of Copper from Primary Vendors, 1949-1956 
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
Chile 285 292 268 362 281 267 226 237 
Canada 83 82 55 82 104 88 100 120 
Mexico 65 63 48 51 66 51 48 53 
Peru 22 29 10 11 27 22 31 43 
Total 553 690 489 619 676 595 594 596 
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Source: Departmento del Cobre (Department of Copper) cited in EI Cobre de Chile. 











Appendix: 2A (Data) & 2B (Graph - See next page) 
Primary Buyers of Chilean Copper: 1956 1958 (Sales in Metric Tons) 
Electronic 
1956 1957 19581 
Germany 2063 38361 28062 
Holland 32416 4091 35224 
United States 1702 3944 55 
England 50313 39342 21252 
Refining 
1956 1957 19581 
Germany 5149 7633 5837 
Holland 234 544 nla 
United States 36779 3843 227 
England 36614 40485 39903 
Blister 
1956 1957 19581 
Germany 10442 10381 22424 
Holland 200 1309 nla 
United States 169614 185835 179485 
England 704 3483 15154 
Source: Departmento del Cobre (Department of Copper) cited in EI Cobre de Chile 











Primary Buyers of Chilean Copper: 
1956 - 1958 (Blister) 
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Primary Buyers of Chilean Copper: 
1956 - 1958 (Electronic) 
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Primary Buyers of Chilean Copper: 
1956 - 1958 (Refined) 
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Appendix 3A (Data & Graph) 
Investments by Major Copper MNCs in Chile (The Gran Mineria): 1950-1959 
Investment 
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Source: Diario de Sesiones del Senado, Informaciones del Banco Central, 2-viii-60 as cited 
in Marion Vera Valenzuela in La Politica Economia del Cobre en Chile (Santiago: 











Appendix 4A (Data & Graph) 
US Direct Investments in Chile (in USD millions) 
Mining Manufacturing Commerce Other Total 
1929 331 7 13 72 423 
1936 383 5 12 84 484 
1943 215 28 15 76 329 
1957 483 22 9 52 666 
1960 517 22 12 188 739 
1964 500 30 20 239 789 
1968 586 66 39 271 962 
1969 452 65 41 288 846 
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Source: NACLA (North American Congress 011 Latin America). New Chile (New York: 






























Copper Taxes per Copper Taxes per Total 
Year Total USD Revenues Revenues 
1960 79.6 13 
1961 75.3 9.4 
1962 89.4 ILl 
1963 86.8 11.9 
1964 85.5 12.2 
1965 85.4 11.4 
1966 90.9 16 
1967 87.8 14.3 
1968 88.4 13.3 
1969 90.2 15.2 
1970 91.2 16.1 
1971 64.1 2 
1972 73.7 l.3 
1973 67.2 1 
Percentage of Copper Taxes for Total US Dollar 
Revenues 














Source: Manuel Lasaga. The Copper Industry in the Chilean Economy: An Econometric 
Analysis (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1981), 13. 
95 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
